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Do  Entry  Conditions 
Vary  across  Markets? 
THE  NUMBER OF FIRMS in a market  is a primary  determinant  of market 
concentration  and performance.  In the long run the number  of firms  is 
affected by the ease with which they can enter and exit. Many recent 
theoretical  models of entry have emphasized  that strategic  behavior  by 
incumbents  may have an important  bearing  on the number  of firms  that 
enter  the market.  For instance,  these models  illustrate  how the extent of 
postentry competition and opportunities  for erecting strategic entry 
barriers  might  affect  the likelihood  that  another  firm  will enter  a market.1 
In contrast to these strategic models, other models of the long-run 
number  of firms  emphasize  that  technological  factors, such  as economies 
of scale, determine  entry. These theories minimize  the importance  of 
strategic  behavior in the long run and instead emphasize that highly 
concentrated  industries  are simply  ones for which  few firms  will fit  given 
the degree  of returns  to scale. 
Peter  C. Reiss's  work  was performed  in  part  while  he was an  Olin  fellow  at the National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts.  We  thank  Robert  Hall,  George 
Stigler,  and  Robert  Willig  for comments. 
1. See John  Roberts,  "Battles  for Market  Share:  Incomplete  Information,  Aggressive 
Strategic  Pricing  and Competitive  Dynamics," in Truman  Bewley, ed., Advances in 
Economic  Theoty  (Cambridge  University  Press, 1987);  and Richard  Gilbert,  "Mobility 
Barriers  and  the Value  of Incumbency,"  in Richard  Schmalensee  and  Robert  Willig,  eds., 
Handbook  of  Industrial  Organization  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  forthcoming),  for 
recent  reviews  of theoretical  models  of entry. 
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Despite the contrasting  implications,  relatively  little empirical  work 
has  attempted  to distinguish  between  the  two views I2  This  paper  develops 
a framework  for assessing the relative importance  of the two views. 
Specifically,  we formulate  an empirical  model in which both increasing 
returns and strategic forces affect the number of active firms. Our 
empirical  section  uses this  framework  to predict  when  a market  will have 
zero, one, or two or more  firms.  We draw  inferences  about  the presence 
of scale economies  from  the size of the market  necessary  to support  one 
firm. Inferences  about the importance  of strategic  behavior  are drawn 
by observing  at what  market  sizes a second firm  enters. The data  we use 
to estimate  our model  consist of observations  on the number  of firms  in 
small,  isolated  retail  and  professional  markets  in the United States. This 
sample offers a new opportunity to  study entry in an imperfectly 
competitive  context. In  contrast  to most entry  studies  that  use aggregate 
cross-section data on different  manufacturing  industries  (for example, 
autos and  frozen  french  fries), we have data  on firms  that  are technolog- 
ically similar.  With  these data  we can reliably  determine  market  bound- 
aries and can control for demand and cost conditions likely to affect 
entry. 
Our  distinction  between technological  and strategic  determinants  of 
entry relies on a model of how the number  of firms  in a market  should 
vary with the size of the market.  Our  inference  procedure  is roughly  as 
2.  One group tries to make this distinction by regressing profits measures on proxies 
for strategic entry barriers; see Richard Schinalensee,  "Inter-Industry Empirical Analy- 
sis,"  in Schmalensee  and Willig, Handbook of Industrial Organization. Another, smaller 
group models entry rates or the number of active firms as functions of such entry barrier 
proxies  as  the  ratio  of  advertising  expenditures  to  sales,  research  and  development 
expenditures to sales,  and capital to output. See Paul Geroski,  "The Empirical Analysis 
of  Entry:  A  Survey,"  working  paper  8318 (University  of  Southampton,  1983), for  a 
summary. The use  of these  proxy  variables is highly suspect;  they could just  as easily 
measure economies of scale. More recent work on entry that has emphasized technological 
factors has either assumed markets are perfectly competitive  or is silent on competitive  or 
strategic issues.  See,  for example,  Dennis W. Carlton, "The Location  and Employment 
Choices of New Firms: An Econometric Model with Discrete and Continuous Endogenous 
Variables," Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 65 (August 1983), pp. 440-49; John 
C.  Hause  and Gunnar du Rietz,  "Entry,  Industry Growth,  and the Microdynamics  of 
Industry Supply," Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 92 (August 1984), pp. 733-57; V. K. 
Chetty  and J. J.  Heckman,  "A  Dynamic  Model  of  Aggregate  Output Supply,  Factor 
Demand  and Entry and Exit for a Competitive  Industry with  Heterogeneous  Plants," 
Journal of Econometrics,  vol.  33 (October-November  1986), pp. 237-62;  and Timothy 
Dunne, Mark J. Roberts, and Larry Samuelson,  "Firm Entry and Exit in U.S.  Manufac- 
turing Industries" (Pennsylvania State University,  1987). Timothy F.  Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  835 
follows. Assume  that  the size of the market  is simply  its population,  that 
is, that  all markets  are  identical,  except that  they have different  numbers 
of identical demanders.  Let SM  represent the population  level below 
which a market  will have no firms  and  above which the market  will have 
at least one firm. This market  size defines the level of demand  where 
variable  profits  just cover a firm's  fixed costs; in other words, it is the 
entry threshold for monopolies. Similarly, there is a duopoly entry 
threshold,  SD, which is the size of the market  at which duopoly  variable 
profit  just covers a second firm's fixed costs.  Our inferences about 
strategic  entry  are  based  on the ratios  of these entry  thresholds.  We term 
this quantity  the entry threshold  ratio, SD/SM.3  Under fairly mild eco- 
nomic  assumptions  about  the  factors  that  affect  entry,  this  ratio  indicates 
how important  strategic  factors  are. The  monopoly  entry  threshold  holds 
constant the degree of returns  to scale from technology. The duopoly 
threshold  thus says something  about how early the second firm  enters 
relative  to the technology used by the monopolist.  In other words, the 
entry threshold  ratio simply reports  the degree to which there are few 
duopolies, taking  into account the tendency to have few firms  because 
of scale economies. 
This inference obviously requires  a more detailed economic justifi- 
cation, which is provided  later. Of course, real data are somewhat  less 
cooperative  than this introduction  suggests. Our  actual  procedures  for 
measuring  the size of the market  are  therefore  somewhat  more  complex. 
Subsequent  parts  of this paper  describe  how we matched  the constructs 
of entry thresholds  to the data and the procedures  we used to define 
markets  and  to determine  the size of the market.  Our  primary  finding  is 
that industries  vary dramatically  in their entry threshold  ratios. We go 
on to suggest  why this finding  might  be a consequence  of sunk  costs. We 
rule out flawed  geographic  market  definition  and governmental  restric- 
tions on entry  as explanations. 
Inferences  from the Entry Equations 
The intuition for our interpretations  of the relationship between 
market  size and  the number  of firms  can readily  be given using figure  1, 
which plots profit  functions, fl, of a firm  as a function of the size of a 
3. We  thank  Robert  Willig  for suggesting  this terminology. 836  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Figure  1. Profits  as a Function  of Market  Size  When  Duopoly  Is Threatened 
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market,  S. Line HM  is the profit  function  of a monopolist.  Line [ID is the 
profit  function  of the second firm  into the market.  Markets  with insuffi- 
cient demand  to support  even one firm  occur when HM <  0. As market 
size, S, increases, there  is eventually  enough  demand  to cover long-run 
fixed costs, and a firm  enters at SM.  In larger  markets,  fID  > 0, a second 
firm  is profitable.  Call  the size of the market  that  just supports  a duopoly 
SD.  Our  empirical  plan  will  be to estimate  SD  and  SM,  as well as the slopes 
of lines HM  and HD. 
ECONOMIC  QUANTITIES 
The intercepts  in figure 1 measure  firms'  fixed costs. Intercept  F1 is 
the fixed costs of the first firm  in a market;  intercept  F2 is the second 
firm's  fixed  costs. Figure  1  assumes  that  the first  firm  in a market  is more Timothly  F. Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  837 
efficient  than the second; in particular,  it allows for the possibility that 
entry  barriers  raise  the fixed costs of the second firm  by B. 
The interpretation  of the slopes in figure 1 is more involved. The 
slopes are the derivative  of profit  with respect to the size of the market. 
The  figure  assumes  that  the slopes of these profit  functions  are  constants 
with respect to S. In general they need not be, but we later describe 
plausible  economic  conditions  under  which they are likely to be. 
The price and quantity  strategies  of the monopolist  and the second 
firm into the market  determine the shape of the reduced-form  profit 
functions  in  figure  1.  These  strategies  are  themselves  functions  of demand 
and cost parameters.  Let cl denote the marginal  costs of the first  firm, 
and c2 the marginal  costs of the second (we assume that marginal  costs 
are constant).  This implies  firms'  costs are ci(W)Q  + Fi(W),  where Q is 
unit  sales and  Wrepresents  exogenous  variables  that  affect  costs. Firms' 
costs can  differ  either  because of differences  in fixed  costs or differences 
in variable  costs. For example, if c2 >  cl, then the second firm  is less 
efficient.  Alternatively,  entry  barriers  might  imply  that  the second firm's 
marginal  costs are greater  by b. The distinction  between b > 0 and c2 > 
cl is that b is the advantage of incumbency per se, while c2 -  cl is the 
relative  productive  efficiency  of the first  firm  into the market.  A similar 
analogy  applies  for differences  between  B and  F2 -  F,. 
We assume that  the factors affecting  a firm's  demand  can be divided 
into determinants  of the size of the market, Y, and those that affect per 
capita demand, Z. Changes in the size of the market  are assumed to 
rotate the demand  curve horizontally.  This implies that total demand 
can  be written  as Q = q(Z, P)  x  S( Y). Here S( Y)  is the size of the market 
and  q(Z, P) is per capita  demand.  In this formulation  S(Y)  is simply  the 
generalization  of market  population.  We allow  it to depend  on more  than 
current  population  in the market.  For example, it could include  popula- 
tion growth  rates or population  leakages,5  and factors such as distance 
to the next town, the number  of people who commute  away from town 
to work, and so on. In general, any exogenous factor that shifts local 
4. We follow the convention of George J. Stigler, The Organization  of Industty 
(Homewood,  Ill.: Irwin, 1968),  pp. 67-70, in treating  all entry barriers  as if they shifted 
entrants'  costs. This should  be interpreted  as including  cases in which they worsen the 
market  for the  entrant's  product. 
5. This concept  avoids some of the problems  that earlier  empirical  studies have had 
when  they  have  taken  the growth  rate  of industry  sales to be exogenous. 838  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
demand  can be included.  Per capita  demand  depends  on factors such as 
per capita  income,  demographic  characteristics,  Z, and  prices, P. In this 
formulation,  a doubling  of S will lead to a doubling  of unit sales at the 
same prices. For now, the effect of Z on demand  is left unspecified. 
We treat price and quantity  setting in monopoly and duopoly as a 
black box because we are interested  only in the functions determining 
profits  in industry  equilibrium  (see figure  1).6 The constant  marginal  cost 
and demand  curve assumptions  imply that the equilibrium  per capita 
variable  profit  of the monopolist,  (PM -  cl)qM,  is a function  only of W 
and Z. That is, it is not a function of the size of the market. Call this 
function  VM  (W,Z),  where V stands  for variable.  Similarly,  the per  capita 
variable  profit  of the second firm  in a duopoly  is (PD  -  C2 -  b)qD. This 
can also be written  as VD(W,  Z), since it too does not depend  on S(Y).  In 
sum, the equilibrium  reduced-form  profit  functions  depicted in figure 1 
are 
(1)  HM  =  VM(W,  Z)S(Y) -  Fl, and 
(2)  HD=  VD(W,  Z)S(Y) -  F2 -  B. 
The interpretation  of figure  1 is now nearly  complete. Equations  1 and  2 
show that profits  are linear  in S. The intercepts  are clearly fixed costs. 
The slopes of the lines are per capita variable  profits  in monopoly and 
duopoly. What  remains  is the interpretation  of the entry thresholds  SM 
and  SD. 
WHAT  CAN  BE  ESTIMATED? 
In  principle,  one would  like  to estimate  the  profit  functions  in  equations 
1  and  2 using  data  on continuous  variables  such as prices and  quantities, 
but in practice such data are not readily available. Instead, all one 
typically  has is information  on the number  of firms  in the market.  In our 
empirical  work, estimates of equations 1 and 2 were obtained  using the 
number  of firms  in the market  (none, one, or two or more) as the only 
6.  Under the assumptions  of constant marginal  cost and horizontal  demand  shift, 
profits  are given by [Pi(qi,  qj) -  ci] qiS -  Fi. Here, qi and  qj are the per capita  outputs  of 
firm  i and  its competitorj.  Note that  the equilibrium  prices  associated  with this profit  for 
monopoly  and  for  duopoly  do  not  depend  on  S. Neither  do  equilibrium  q's. Thus  equilibrium 
Q is proportional  to S, as is equilibrium  variable  profit. Timothy F.  Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  839 
dependent variable. As is well known, the use of limited dependent 
variables  means  that  the functions  HM and  HD can be estimated  only up 
to an unknown  scale factor.7  Our economic inferences therefore  must 
be based on ratios. 
The first  ratio  of interest  is the monopoly  break-even  market  size, SM, 
determined  by the condition  HM =  0. Setting monopoly  profits  to zero 
implies 
(3)  SM =  F, /(PM  -  ci)qMq 
The break-even  duopoly  market  size, SD, is similarly  determined: 
(4)  SD  =  (F2 +  B)/(PD  -  C2-  b) qD 
The entry  threshold  ratio,  SD/SM, is therefore 
SD  F  (PM -  CI)qM  X F2 + B1 
(5)  SM  L(PD -  c2-  b)qD  F,  J 
(PM-  C  I)QM  x  F2 + B1 
E  (PD  -  C2-  b)QD  F,j 
where the last equality  follows by multiplying  numerator  and denomi- 
nator  by the same  size of the market,  S. This ratio  is a combined  measure 
of the fraction by which variable profits fall between monopoly and 
duopoly  and the ratio of fixed costs between the first and second firm. 
The geometry of figure 1 illustrates  this result. Underlying  economic 
forces that  shift  the fixed  costs of monopoly  relative  to dupoly  move the 
intercepts  in figure 1, while forces that shift relative variable profits 
change  the slopes of the profit  lines. It is clear from equations  3 and 5 
that the entry threshold  ratio keeps technological  factors constant and 
shows the extent to which strategic factors affect entry. Equation 3 
shows  that  the importance  of fixed  costs is reflected  in  the  entry  threshold 
for monopoly. Equation  5 summarizes  the differences between a mo- 
nopolist  and  a duopolist.  This ratio  can be large  for several reasons that 
either increase the duopolist's fixed costs or lower duopoly variable 
profit.  To discriminate  between these two effects, one can compute  the 
ratio  of the firms'  variable  profits: 
(6)  SVM/SVD  =  QM (PM  -  CX)/QD (PD  -  C2 -  b). 
7. Stephen  R. Cosslett, "Distribution-Free  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimator  of the 
Binary  Choice  Model,"  Econometrica,  vol. 51 (May 1983),  pp. 765-82. 840  Brookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
This is an estimate  of the ratio of monopoly  to duopoly variable  profits 
and  measures  the fall in variable  profits  when competition  increases. 
The fall in variable profits depends on at least three important 
quantities:  the size of entry barriers,  b, differences in marginal  costs, 
and the degree of competition under duopoly.8 Variable profit in a 
duopoly  relative  to that  in a monopoly  will be lower the higher  is each of 
the three determinants.  In the empirical  work that follows, we, like 
others  before  us, cannot  distinguish  among  these reasons  as to why the 
ratio  may  be small. However, our  framework  does permit  us to say that 
at least one of these factors has effects. Moreover, if one is willing to 
maintain  particular  assumptions  about some of these effects, then one 
can  discriminate  among  alternative  theories  of entry.  For  example,  some 
economists believe there are no entry barriers,  that all firms  have the 
same cost function, and that both local monopolies  and  duopolies have 
the same degree of market  power-none.  This polar view is testable 
using  equation  5. 
STATIC  AND  DYNAMIC  CONSIDERATIONS 
Equations  1 and 2 appear  static because they relate  monopoly  profit- 
ability  only to single-period  demand  and  cost conditions.  This raises  two 
kinds  of concerns. First, how are  econometric  specifications  affected  by 
expected profits  changing  over time?  We defer this question  to the next 
section. Second, how are monopoly profits to be interpreted,  given 
dynamic  entry-deterrence  activities?  This second issue arises in many 
contexts. For example, monopolists may expend resources to deter 
another  firm's entry. The threat  of future entry may also lead them to 
limit price. We interpret  these to be dynamic considerations in that 
preentry  events affect monopoly  profitability. 
These considerations  suggest  that  the reduced-form  monopoly  profit 
equation 1 may be misspecified  because it has no dynamic  or strategic 
factors  affecting  profits;  the costs to the monopolist  of limit  pricing,  for 
example, do not appear in equation 1. However, the benefits to the 
monopolist  could show up in equation  2 in the form of higher  b or B. In 
fact, equation 1 is correctly specified. Preserving the advantages of 
8.  Product substitution also affects this ratio. See Timothy Bresnahan and Peter Reiss, 
"Entry in Monopoly Markets," working paper (Stanford University,  Graduate School of 
Business,  May 1987). Timothy F.  Bresnahain and Peter- C. Reiss  841 
incumbency  may or may not cost the monopolist  resources; even if it 
does,  these costs  should not appear in our estimates of the entry 
thresholds.  This can be seen by returning  to figure 1. Only when the 
threat  of entry  is substantial  will a monopolist  spend money to block it. 
The  markets  where  the threats  are  greatest  are  those in the neighborhood 
of  SD. Empirical  inferences about flM, however, are drawn from the 
threshold  condition  for monopoly entry. As a result, monopoly profits 
are inferred  from the region around  SM.  Thus the region in which the 
monopoly profit function departs from equation 1 because of entry 
deterrence  or limit pricing  expenditures  is irrelevant  to our inferences 
about  SM.  Entry  deterrence  activities therefore  affect only SD, which is 
precisely  what  we want  to have happen. 
Similar  arguments  apply  to considerations  of potential  entry.  Potential 
competition  (from other towns, for instance, or from firms in similar 
businesses in the same town) may affect monopoly  pricing  and profits. 
Again,  however,  it is unlikely  that  potential  competition  lowers  the profit 
of a monopolist  when that  profit  is just barely  positive. 
The only problem  with our static  arguments  arises  when entry  by one 
firm  preempts  entry by another,  and there is competition  to be the first 
firm  into  the market.  This might  occur, for example,  in a growing  market 
with either natural  monopoly features or with opportunities  to erect 
barriers  to entry.9  In such circumstances,  SM  will not be a nonstrategic 
value:  firms  will enter  at market  sizes that  involve losses in order  to gain 
the future value of  the monopoly. Our interpretation  of the entry 
threshold  ratio  is unaffected  by this  possibility  since here  again  industries 
with  a large  ratio  are characterized  by strategic  entry. 
Sample and Data 
Any empirical  study of entry  faces two important  practical  questions 
when passing from economic theory to data. What is the appropriate 
definition  of a market,  and what is the appropriate  definition  of a firm? 
The  definition  of a market  is important  because  competition  from  outside 
the  market  makes  it difficult  to know  how many  competitors  a firm  faces. 
9. Drew Fudenberg  and Jean Tirole, "Preemption  and Rent Equalization  in the 
Adoption of New Technology,"  Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52 (July 1985), pp. 383- 
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In theory  it is easy to know  what  constitutes  a firm,  but several  practical 
questions  about  the identity  of real-world  firms  remain. 
MARKET  DEFINITION 
There  are two primary  advantages  to studying  entry  into retail  trades: 
demand and fixed costs are localized. The geographic specificity of 
demand  and costs suggests that in principle  one could readily  compute 
entry threshold  ratios  by assembling  a large  sample  of retail  markets.  In 
practice  these comparisons  are not so easy because many  retail  markets 
overlap. Thus  demand  and  cost conditions  in one market  may affect the 
ease or frequency  of entry  into another  market.  A common  example of 
this is  the suburban shopping mall that competes with downtown 
businesses. Although  it is possible to model the effect a neighboring 
market  has on entry, these neighborhood  effects complicate  theoretical 
and empirical  models. We minimized  the importance  of these effects by 
selecting isolated markets. Our sample consisted of rural  towns and 
cities for which we could reasonably  identify surrounding  areas that 
have few competing  population  centers. These markets  were concen- 
trated, and their firms  typically  faced little external competition. Con- 
sequently, entry by a second firm  was likely to have a large impact  on 
the conditions  of competition.  It also seemed likely that monopolists  in 
these markets would have some incentive to  erect entry barriers. 
Unfortunately,  we had no information  on the mechanisms that firms 
were likely to use to prevent entry. Moreover, we did not have infor- 
mation  on other  strategic  variables,  such as the prices charged  by these 
firms or their unit sales.10  What we did have, however, was excellent 
information  on the number  of firms  in the market  and the size of that 
market. 
We began with an initial  sample  of 149  markets  (towns) drawn  from 
our earlier study of  automobile retailing.11  All counties with  1980 
populations  under  10,000  were used to identify  counties  that  had  distinct 
centers  of population.  We then  used maps  to see whether  this population 
center was isolated. Our definition  of isolated was that no other town 
10. The Census  Bureau  suppresses  information  about  industry  sales in markets  with 
only one or two firms.  Similarly,  these places are not heavily sampled  in price  or output 
indexes. 
11. Bresnahan  and  Reiss, "Entry  in Monopoly  Markets." Timothy F.  Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  843 
with a population  greater than 1,000 could tie within 25 miles of the 
population  center. This distance included  towns outside the county or 
state but  not across U.S. borders.  12 Furthermore,  no town or city with a 
populationgreaterthan  1,000  could  be so large  and  nearthat  its population 
divided by the driving  distance (up to 125 miles) from the population 
center  was more  than  600. This ruled  out, for example, towns that  were 
within 100  miles of a city of 1 million  people. 
Counties  that passed these tests generally  had a single central  town 
(town  1)  and  a surrounding  area  of lower  population  density. We counted 
other  towns as part  of town 1 if they were within  two miles or otherwise 
close together.  Counties  that contained  two towns or clusters of towns 
each with a population  of 1,000  or more  were usually  excluded  from  the 
sample.'3  Most of the 149 towns identified  by these procedures were 
county seats concentrated  in the Midwest  and West. 
We supplemented  this initial sample with an additional  53 markets 
because some of the sample industries  required  relatively large small 
towns to support  two firms  (although  all the industries  had monopolies 
within our original sample of markets). To enlarge the sample, we 
searched  for more  towns that were isolated  but not necessarily  alone in 
their  counties. To be included, the town had to be at least a forty-mile 
round-trip  to the next town of 1,000 or more people and could not be 
close to an urban area. We then refined this list to get only isolated 
towns. In several cases there were two towns, quite far apart, in the 
same county; this part  of the sample  included  relatively  more Western 
towns. 
INDUSTRY  SELECTION  AND  DEFINITIONS  OF  FIRMS 
In selecting geographic  markets, we were careful to eliminate the 
possibility  that nearby competitors  could contaminate  our inferences. 
In selecting  the industries,  we recognized  and  avoided  a similar  effect in 
the definition  of product  markets.  For the empirical  analysis  to resemble 
12. Distances  are  almost  always  measured  as straight  lines. 
13. Information  about  towns was obtained  from  the  Rand  McNally  CommercialAtlas 
(Chicago:  Rand  McNally, 1983);  and U.S. Bureau  of the Census, Censuis of Population, 
1980, General Population  Characteristics  (U.S.  Department of Commerce,  1982). There 
were  four  exceptions  where  we identified  two towns close to each other  and where  there 
were  no other  large  towns within  twenty-five  miles of either.  Town 1 was then defined  as 
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the theory  closely, one must  be able to identify  those firms  in town that 
sell related  products.  Problems  that arise in counting  firms  can best be 
illustrated  by examples. 
An example of an industry  that cannot be analyzed  is tobacconists. 
Tobacco can be sold in smoke shops, drugstores,  grocery stores, gas 
stations,  and so forth.  Tracking  and  measuring  all such outlets would  be 
prohibitively  difficult.  Thus  we tried  to select products  or trades  in which 
product  and  firm  definitions  were fairly  standard.  In practice,  this meant 
minimizing  the possibility that the product  was sold through  unrelated 
or diversified  retailers. As a result, a large number  of manufactured 
goods were ruled  out. 
The other criterion was that an industry had to have break-even 
market  sizes within  the population  ranges  in our sample  of towns.  14 We 
settled  on thirteen  retail  and  professional  service industries:  farm  equip- 
ment dealers, movie theaters, new or used tire dealers, beauty shops, 
barbers, plumbers, electricians, new auto dealers, physicians, veteri- 
narians,  dentists, drugstores,  and  optometrists  and  opticians. 
Market  definition  also raised  an issue of what firms  to include in the 
sample. All these industries  had some competition  from other kinds of 
firms. For instance, movie theaters sell a product  that is a reasonably 
well defined as far as retailers are concerned. There are, of course, 
substitutes  for movies, such as home videos, but the existence of these 
substitutes did not affect the analysis as long as home video stores' 
strategic  behavior was not a major  influence  on the theaters. As with 
any good, the substitutes  merely  define  the slope and size of the demand 
curve  for movie houses. 
Data  on the  presence  of firms  in  a market  were  obtained  from  American 
Business  Lists, a company  that  processes telephone  books.  15  From  ABL 
we obtained  a listing  of each firm  that advertised  itself, as of June 1987, 
as being in a particular  yellow pages "industry."  To verify the listings, 
14. As a practical  matter,  this  meant  we were  limited  to industries  with  between  25,000 
and 200,000 firms nationwide.  We added physicians and dentists despite their larger 
numbers  because  we suspected  their  fixed  costs were like those of the automobile  dealers 
we had  already  studied.  We kept  some industries  with  fewer  firms,  such  as theaters,  since 
we expected that they would exist in reasonable  numbers  in our small, isolated places 
despite their substantial  fixed costs. Similarly,  despite their  greater  numbers,  we chose 
beauty  shops so the sample  would  have an industry  with  very small  fixed  costs. 
15. Much of ABL's business is selling mailing  lists to the mail order industry  and 
prospects  lists to traveling  salesmen. Timnothy  F. Br-esnahan and Peter  C. Reiss  845 
we checked telephone company classification  schemes for ambiguous 
listing  conventions.16 An independent  check was made  of the automobile 
dealer  telephone listings using manufacturers'  franchise  data. Finally, 
we visited various towns in the sample to confirm  the listings. These 
checks convinced  us that the telephone  listings were remarkably  accu- 
rate. 
We eliminated  what we considered  to be duplicate  firms,  those with 
either the same name as another  firm  in the same town and the same 
industry  or with the same telephone  number  as another  firm  in the same 
town  in  the  same  industry.  17 Two  listings  with  the same  name  overwhelm- 
ingly  meant  changes  in phone numbers  at the same address;  these were 
clearly  not two firms. 
Listings with the same phone number  but different  names occurred 
in the professional  services industries  with some frequency.  These were 
overwhelmingly  group  practices.  For  example,  the phone  book  for  Elko, 
Nevada, listed twelve physicians, all with the same phone number  and 
address as the Elko Medical Clinic. We treated a group practice as a 
single firm. This convention affected our empirical procedures only 
when it resulted  in a monopoly.18 Our  sample  would have contained  six 
(of sixty-seven)  fewer monopolies  for dentists, two (of sixty-one)  fewer 
for physicians, and no fewer monopolies for veterinarians  if we had 
reclassified  all group  practices  as two firms.  19 
A final definitional  issue occurred when clinics were listed in the 
professional  service industries.  Our  policy was to treat  these entries as 
one firm.  Thus, for example, when a professional  and a clinic with the 
16. There  turned  out to be even fewer  classification  problems  in the yellow pages  than 
we anticipated.  For example,  we thought  that "tire  retreading  and repair,"  "tire  dealer- 
new," and  "tire  dealer-used"  listings  might  need to be aggregated.  In  fact, all the firms  in 
these small  towns were listed as being "tire dealer-new" if they were in any of these 
categories.  This reflects the practice  of sellers of space in yellow pages as much as of 
purchasers  of space. 
17. However,  the same  firm  can count  both  as a plumber  and  as an electrician,  or as a 
tire  dealer  and  as either  an auto  or farm  equipment  dealer. 
18. Since  we treated  industries  with two or more  firms  as duopolies,  reclassifications 
that  led to two or more firms  were irrelevant,  and no reclassification  could lead to zero 
firms. 
19. Three  of the six pairs  of dentists in group  practice  had the same last name. We 
suspected  that  these were husband-wife  or brothers  (or father-son)  practices.  It seemed 
clear  that these should  be classified  as one firm.  The treatment  of the remaining  group 
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same address and phone number  were given, we counted them as one 
firm.  When  only a clinic  was listed, with  no separate  professional  listing, 
we also counted  the clinic as one firm. 
NEIGHBORHOOD  EFFECTS 
In constructing our sample we were careful to minimize market 
definition  problems.  However, our  inferences  were likely to be affected 
by the possibility that people living in the market  may purchase some 
services in the next town or county. Such shoppers surely exist, 
especially if there is no firm in town. To take an extreme example, 
suppose that our towns were all only 2 miles from the next large town. 
Clearly  it would be silly to ignore competitors  in the next town. But if 
there were no other towns within 1,000 miles, there would be few 
opportunistic  shopping trips. How could our sample selection rules 
ensure  that  opportunistic  shoppers  would  be unimportant? 
The existence of opportunistic  shopping affects the shape of the 
residual  demand  curve  facing  firms  in town. This curve summarizes  the 
demand available, taking into account the arbitrage  activities of cus- 
tomers and the supply  behavior  of firms  in other towns.20  What  we had 
to ensure  was that  residual  demand  in our  towns was not completely  flat. 
To see why this was necessary, consider  figure  2. First, suppose that a 
large fraction of local demand could easily be satisfied by low-cost 
shopping  elsewhere. Then  the residual  demand  curve  facing  the firms  in 
any one town will be flat, and the entry of a second firm would not 
increase competititon.  Clearly, there is a range of distances between 
towns, say up to D*, for which this is the appropriate  model. 
As we make  town 1 more and more  isolated, some customers  will be 
unwilling  to shop  elsewhere  unless  there  is a substantial  price  advantage. 
The number  and size of these occasions determines  the slope and size 
of the residual  demand  curve. At D*, it is profitable  for firms  in town 1 
20. See Jonathan  B. Baker  and Timothy  F. Bresnahan,  "The Gains  from Merger  or 
Collusion  in Product-Differentiated  Industries,"  Journal  of Industrial  Economics,  vol. 33 
(June  1985),  pp. 427-44, for a complete  definition  of the residual  demand  curve. David  T. 
Scheffman  and Pablo  T. Spiller,  "Geographic  Market  Definition  under  the U.S. Depart- 
ment of Justice Merger Guidelines, " Journal ofLaw  and Economics,  vol. 30 (April 1987), 
pp.  123-47, show that residual demand curve analysis is the appropriate  means of 
geographical  market  definition  when  market  power  in local areas  is at issue. Timothy F.  Bresnahan  anid Peter  C. Reiss  847 
Figure 2.  Monopoly Profits as a Function of Distance to Competitive Market 
IIM 
2 miles  D*  D**  1,000 miles 
Distance 
to raise prices above the competitive price. By doing this they would 
concede some purchases to opportunistic  shoppers but would obtain 
prices above the competitive level on remaining  purchases. Thus for 
distances  beyond  D*  in figure  2, the residual  demand  curve facing  firms 
in town 1 would permit  some market  power, even taking  into account 
the possibility of competition from outside. Obviously, as distance 
increases,  the number  of purchases  made  locally for any particular  price 
increases.  Thus  the amount  of local market  power increases. 
Eventually,  town 1 will be so distant  and isolated that there is little 
further  increase in market  power. This distance is labeled  D**  in fig- 
ure 2. Beyond  this point, the residual  demand  curve  facing  firms  in town 
1 is unchanged,  and the market  can virtually  be treated  as a monopoly 
in the classic sense. 
Many people in small, isolated towns doubtless make some outside 
purchases.2' However, it  is  incorrect to  interpret this behavior as 
21. We call this the Aunt Mathilda  effect. A surprising  number  of economists know 
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evidence that markets are in the left-most part in figure 2, and that 
therefore  local entry  is not a competitive  event. From  D* to D** there  is 
local market  power. We believe that our markets  lie mostly in the area 
close to and to the right  of D**. Later, we test this belief by including 
measures  of distance  in the definition  of S. We use two measures  of the 
accessibility  of the next town:  distance  in miles  and  the number  of people 
who commute  to work  outside the county containing  town 1. 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLES 
Once the original  list of firms  was screened,  we calculated  how many 
firms  there were in each market.  Each industry  in each town was then 
put into one of three categories: nonopolies, which have no firms; 
monopolies;  and "duopolies," which have two or more (see appendix 
table A-1). Since the only inference we draw about duopolies is that 
profits  for the second firm  are positive, this last classification  is unim- 
portant  for  the inferences  that  follow. The  industries  in the sample  varied 
substantially  in the number  of towns with zero, one, and two or more 
firms.  Beauty shops, for example, were ubiquitous,  with only 5 percent 
of the towns having  none;  47 percent, however, lacked  a barber. 
In constructing  table  A-1, we worried  that  procedures  for identifying 
firms  might  mismeasure  the dependent  variable  by missing  active firms. 
This could have happened  if firms  were listed in yellow page sections we 
did not track or if  some were not listed at all. To explore these 
possibilities,  we checked telephone  company  classification  schemes for 
ambiguous  listing  conventions  and  found  that, although  the conventions 
do sometimes  vary by telephone  company,  they do not vary in unusual 
ways. We also visited towns in our sample  to verify listing  conventions. 
When visiting these towns, we also asked which firms in the area 
provided  particular  services to check whether  we might  be missing  firms 
because the entrepreneurs  did not pay business phone rates or because 
they relied  on word  of mouth  instead  of the yellow pages. With  very few 
exceptions, usually instances of very recent entry or exit, the yellow 
pages were comprehensive.  Because it was impossible  to visit all towns 
in the sample, we also made several checks using other data sources. 
We checked some automobile  dealer  telephone listings  using manufac- 
urers'  franchise  records.  There  were no differences  between our yellow 
page listings and these records. We also checked the accuracy of the 
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ation. Their  records  allowed us to examine the possibility  that inactive 
physicians  were prevalent  in our markets,  which could have caused a 
problem  for our firm counting convention. There were some inactive 
physicians in our sample counties, though they did not appear to be 
prevalent  outside  Arizona  retirement  areas.  For  the 149-place  subsample 
in which  our  town was the only economic center  in the county, we were 
able  to redo  our  analysis  based  on the total  number  of physicians  certified 
rather  than  the number  in the yellow pages. This change  in the definition 
of the dependent  variable  did not alter  our  findings. 
Finally,  in  considering  the adequacy  of our  definition  of the dependent 
variable  and the possibility  of underreporting,  we noted the prevalence 
of beauty  shops in our sample.  Only 10  of our  202  towns failed  to have a 
yellow page listing  for a beauty shop. These towns are extremely  small, 
and their  female population  is even smaller.22  Even though  beauticians 
in the smallest  towns necessarily  work sporadically,  they use the yellow 
pages  to advertise. 
MARKET  SIZE  VARIABLES 
Exogenous variables were divided into three classes: cost  shift- 
ers, W, determinants  of the size of the market, Y, and other demand 
shifters,  Z. Definitions  and  descriptive  statistics  can  be found  in appendix 
table  A-2. 
The size of the market,  S, is the number  of effective demanders  in the 
market.  Given  the  diversity  of the industries,  the definition  of a demander 
might  vary across our industries.  We always scaled S(Y)  to a particular 
unit of demand.  In most cases this was the number  of people living in 
town (TPOP), measured  by the 1980  census. Of course, there is some 
demand  from  people living  near  but not in town; OPOP is an estimate  of 
that  population.23  We give OPOP a coefficient  of XI  in S( ), to measure 
how important  demanders  out of town are relative to those in town. 
Some  people living  in town or nearby  might  make  purchases  elsewhere 
22. These  are  basically  mining  and  timber  camps,  as far  as we can tell. 
23. Specifically,  the variable  includes all population  in towns within ten miles, as 
reported  in the 1980  census or by Rand  McNally.  We counted  all significant  population  in 
towns  in the county  and  subtracted  this  from  the reported  census population  of the county 
to obtain an average nontown population  figure. In some cases seasonal population 
variations,  Indian  reservations,  and  geographical  peculiarities  led to minor  modifications 
of  this  procedure.  Under  the  assumption  that  nontown  population  was  uniformly  distributed 
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at times; OCTY measures  leakages  in demand  by the number  of people 
who commute  to work outside of the county. This variable  is included 
in S( ) with a coefficient  of X2.24  The other  variables  in our  most common 
specifications  of S(Y) recognize  that  market  size is not a static concept. 
Markets  that  have recently  decreased  in size may have more  firms  than 
would be expected at their  current  variables.  This is particularly  true if 
firms  have sunk  costs in earlier,  higher-demand  times. Markets  that  have 
recently grown  might  also have fewer firms  than otherwise  expected if 
entry is a slow process. In our sample,  growth  or decline in one decade 
did seem to predict  growth or decline in the next. When firms  expect 
decreases  in the size of the market,  fewer will be active, while expected 
growth  should  lead  to more  active firms.  Thus  lagged  growth  and  decline 
variables  have complex  interpretations  in S( ). To capture  these effects, 
we included  the asymmetric  population  growth variables,  NGRW and 
PGRW, which are the negative and the positive parts of population 
growth  in town 1  from 1970  to 1980.25  In most of our specifications 
(7)  S(Y) = TPOP +  XIOPOP +  X2OCTY  +  X3NGRW +  X4PGRW. 
For  veterinarians  and  farm  equipment  dealers  it was less obvious  how 
the size of the market  should  be modeled. For veterinarians,  per capita 
demand  may be thought  of in terms of numbers  of people (owners of 
pets) plus the numbers  of different  kinds  of farm  animals.  Alternatively, 
the demand  for either  veterinarians  'services or those of farm  equipment 
dealers  might  be predicted  by the number  and size of farms. For these 
industries  we experimented  with specifications  that used information 
from  the Census  of Agriculture  on the county population  of cattle, pigs, 
horses, and  sheep, and  the number  of farms  in two size classes.26 
computed  using  this  residual  population.  Variations  in  this  procedure,  such  as alternatively 
defining  OPOP as county  population  minus  the  population  of town 1, made  little  difference 
for estimates  of break-even  market  sizes. 
24. In some specifications  OCTY  was replaced  by DISTANCE,  the distance  in miles 
to the next town  with  a population  over 1,000. 
25. Inclusion  follows  Hause  and  du  Rietz, "Entry,  Industry  Growth,  and  the Micrody- 
namics  of Industry  Supply."  There  is some question  here  of whether  the ten-year  change 
in town population  is the relevant  predictor  for future  market  growth,  but we considered 
twenty-year  lags  with  little  change  in the results. 
26. The size classes were: sales greater  than $40,000  and greater  than $2,500. Since 
these were countywide  data, they were divided  by the land  area  of the county in square 
miles. Some  of the sample  counties  were  much  larger  than  the economic  market  served  by 
the town. Using  an estimate  of the population  density  of farms  or livestock  made  large  and 
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For beauty shops and barber  shops the variables  in equation  7 were 
deflated  by the fraction  of the county  population  that  was female  or male 
in 1980.27  Thus for these two professions, size of the market has a 
somewhat  different  interpretation. 
OTHER  DEMAND  AND  COST  VARIABLES 
We experimented  with different  variables  that might  affect a firm's 
variable  and  fixed  costs, W.  In  all  our  reported  specifications,  Wconsisted 
of the per  acre  cost of agricultural  land,  FLAND  VAL.  This variable  may 
capture  not only the effect of land  prices  on fixed  costs but  also the effect 
of agricultural  wealth on demand. We also experimented  with wage 
variables,  such as the average  retail  wage, but found the cost of land to 
be the most important  shifter of fixed costs. Two important  variables 
left in the constant  and the error  term  are capital  costs and the costs of 
the entrepreneur's  or professional's  own labor. The former  we did not 
expect to vary by much  in our cross-section  of rural  places.28  The latter 
was somewhat  more  problematic,  since it was presumably  a measure  of 
the opportunity  cost of an entrepreneur's  time. To the extent that this 
varied in a way other than was captured  by our covariates, our error 
term  included  these unobservable  effects. 
The demand shifters, Z,  varied somewhat by industry. We also 
experimented  with these variables  and others. For every industry,  we 
included  income  per capita, VPINC.  For theaters,  we included  both the 
fraction  of people  age 65 and  older, VOLD,  and  the fraction  18  and  older, 
VNOTEEN.  Here as elsewhere where we used age variables,  we tried 
replacing  them  with the fraction  of the adult  population  that  was college 
educated, VCOLL.  For tire dealers and auto dealers, we included a 
measure  of the total farmland  acreage near town, VFFARM,  thinking 
that there might  be some sales of light trucks or tires to farmers. For 
drugstores, physicians, dentists, and optometrists, we included the 
fraction  of people age 65 and older, the fraction 18 and older, and the 
fraction  born  in 1980,  VBIRTHS.  These variables  taken  together  add  to 
27. There  was little variation  from the national  norm  in the percentage  of women in 
the  larger  towns,  but  as previously  noted, some  of the small  towns  were  essentially  mining 
or logging  camps. 
28. These small  firms  may vary somewhat  in their  creditworthiness,  which we left in 
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a complex  predictor  of the health  status  of the population.  We also added 
the log of heating degree days, V1nHEAT, as a potential explainer of 
health  status. This variable  was so successful that  we tried  it in all other 
industries'  functions  as a predictor  of regional  taste differences. 
Finally, plumbers, cooling contractors, heating contractors, and 
electricians  provided  a special problem.  It seemed likely that they sold 
services  to buildings  as much  as to people. An  obvious  candidate  variable 
was the number  of residences  per capita, VHO  USES, and  their  average 
value, VHOUCST.  Cooling  contractor  specifications  also included  the 
log of cooling degree days, V1nCOOL, and heating  contractors  that of 
heating  degree  days (V1nHEA1). 
Given the extensive use of variables  to control for other shifters in 
demand,  we feel our interpretation  of the size of the market  experiment 
is warranted.  A market  twice as large represents  a simple doubling  of 
the demand  curve.29  Firms in our small cities and towns operate well 
below the scale of those in larger  areas, so that the constant marginal 
cost assumption  is likely right. Therefore  the assumptions  underlying 
our framework  of inference were satisfied  for our sample, though we 
would  be unwilling  lightly  to extend them  to larger  markets. 
Specification  of Econometric  Relations 
The discussion to this point can be summarized  by writing  out the 
equations  for the profit  function  for monopoly  and duopoly and stating 
the conditions for observing zero, one, or two or more firms in the 
market.  First,  if  we add  unknown  parameters  and  error  terms  to equations 
1 and 2, we get 
(8)  flm =  VM(W,Z,O)  x  S(Y,A) -  Fl()y,W) -  EM,  and 
(9)  fID  =  VD(W,Z,O)  x  S(Y,A)  -  (F2 -  B)(y,W) 
-  ED. 
The form of S(Y,A)  has already  been given in equation  7. Similarly,  the 
variables  that  enter V( ) for each industry  have also been described.  To 
29. This interpretation  would become troubling  if we were to extend the analysis 
toward  urban  areas  and  toward  the entry  of the third  and  fourth  firms  and  so on. Thus  the 
use of our techniques  for determining  the number  of firms at which markets  become 
effectively  competitive  will require  further  thought. Timothy F. Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  853 
simplify estimation, we assumed that V( ), the equilibrium  per capita 
variable  profit,  is linear  in cost and  demand  variables: 
(10)  VM(W,Z,O)  =  VPO +  OkAZk, and 
(  11  )  VD(W,Z,O)  =  VPO  -  VPD +  k0AZk. 
Equations 8 and 10 show that the coefficient of the lead market-size 
variable,  usually  TPOP,  is VPO  and  ok  iS the coefficient  of the  Zk variable 
in flM. Similarly,  TPOP has coefficient  VPO -  VPD in fID.  Further, 
equations  8 and 10  imply  that TPOP  interacts  with all of the variables  in 
variable  profits. In our tables, variables in VM  and VD begin with the 
letter V. 
In most specifications  we also assumed  that  fixed costs varied  among 
dealers  in the same way. Specifically,  these differences  are assumed  to 
be linear  in the factor  prices.31 
(12)  F,  = FIXO +  tywRETWAG  +  tYLFLANDVAL, 
(13)  F2 + B =  FIXO +  FIXD  +  -ywRETWAG  +  -YLFLANDVAL. 
In  both  the  variable  cost function  and  the  fixed  cost function,  the constant 
terms differ  for monopolies and duopolies. The difference, VPD, mea- 
sures the fall in variable  profit  due to entry. The difference  in the fixed 
cost intercepts, FIXD, measures heterogeneity  in fixed costs or entry 
barriers  of the B form. 
The introduction  of error permits the construction of a likelihood 
function: 
(14)  Po =  Pr(O  firms) = Pr(flM < 0), 
(15)  PI =  Pr(1 firm) = Pr(IlM  - 0 and fiD  C  0), and 
(16)  P2 =  Pr(2 firms) = Pr(fID >  0). 
In all the results reported in our tables, ED  =  EM,  and the errors are 
normal. Thus these specifications are ordered probits. In work not 
30. We  tried  nonlinear  specifications  for variable  profits-without much  success. 
31. The linear  functional  forms  for fixed costs and variable  profit  are not implied  by 
the theory, since a change  in the functional  form of the error  (say from probit  to logit) 
could  be offset by a transformation  of the profit  function.  However, the linearity  was not 
crucial  to our  interpretation.  Instead,  we used  the  linearity  of H  in  S only  to obtain  reduced- 
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reported  here,  we have  experimented  with  alternative  assumptions  about 
the error  terms.32 
Tables 1 and 2 estimate specifications  for the industries.33  There are 
few surprises  in the coefficients  of Z and W  variables  (those prefixed  V 
in the table and FLANDVAL)  and we have little to say about them. It 
was our  intention  to include  too many  variables  in this  part  of the  function 
so as to avoid  the bias  of left-out  variables  in our  estimates  of the market- 
size coefficients.  Given  that  these variables  are  largely  insignificant,  the 
tendency would be to remove rather  than add them. Thus there is little 
evidence for any remaining  omitted-variable  bias. 
NGRW and PGRW are difficult  to interpret  in the best of circum- 
stances. In our  data,  where  the endogenous  variable  is measured  in 1987 
and  most of the exogenous  variables  are  measured  in the previous  (1980) 
census, these variables  are particularly  hard to interpret.  The lagged 
pattern  of growth  is predicting  growth  both before  and after  the date we 
observed  the endogenous  variable.  Thus  the variables  have not only the 
Hause and du Rietz interpretation,  but also a more elementary  one of 
predicting  demand  at the time we observed  it.34 
Results for Individual Industries 
For clarity, we discuss results by topic rather  than  by industry.  The 
tables divide the industries  into a "professional"  services group  and a 
''retail"  group. 
ENTRY  THRESHOLD  RATIOS 
The parameters  of most immediate  interest are the differences be- 
tween monopoly and duopoly variable profits and fixed costs.  The 
32. See Bresnahan  and  Reiss, "Entry  in  Monopoly  Markets."  Our  other  specifications 
were probitlike.  One  let EM  be the maximum  of two correlated  normals,  while  ED was their 
minimum.  This gave a greater  self-selection  flavor  to monopoly versus duopoly entry. 
Another  specification  made  ED  smaller  than EM  by the value of one-half  normal  random 
variable.  This also permitted  a greater  tendency  for monopoly  profit  to be random.  We 
also considered  heteroskedastic  probits,  with the variance  depending  on S. Since these 
specifications  made  little  difference  and  were  bulky,  we have suppressed  them  here. 
33. No results  are presented  for beauty  shops, which were so frequent  in the sample 
that  SM  could  not be estimated  with  any reliability. 
34. Hause  and  du  Rietz, "Entry,  Industry  Growth,  and  the Microdynamics  of Industry 
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Table 1.  Parameter Estimates for "Professional" Industriesa 
Indepenident  Physi-  Veter  i-  Drug-  Optom-  Auito 
variable  clans  Denitists  niaians  stores  etrists  dealers 
OPOP  -0.141  -0.451  -0.778  -0.528  - 0.405  0.437 
(0.585)  (0.455)  (0.408)  (0.273)  (0.437)  (0.824) 
NGRW  -  1.108  - 0.429  -0.982  -0.822  -  1.633  2.435 
(1.395)  (1.017)  (1.783)  (0.931)  (1.388)  (0.879) 
PGRW  2.045  1.899  -0.705  0.612  -0.347  -0.107 
(1.359)  (1.084)  (0.555)  (0.714)  (0.472)  (0.375) 
OCTY  -0.519  0.278  2.068  -0.108  3.317  0.796 
(0.420)  (0.984)  (1.365)  (0.198)  (1.343)  (1.099) 
VPO  1.981  -2.262  -  1.115  -0.343  -  1.690  -0.762 
(0.935)  (0.858)  (0.421)  (0.975)  (0.500)  (1.299) 
VPD  0.340  0.179  0.102  0.169  0.360  0.181 
(0.188)  (0.231)  (0.106)  (0.271)  (0.125)  (0.217) 
FIXO  1.095  1.237  0.281  1.153  1.801  0.865 
(0.311)  (0.334)  (0.302)  (0.333)  (0.296)  (0.289) 
FIXD  0.818  1.668  1.287  1.733  1.206  0.832 
(0.287)  (0.381)  (0.261)  (0.402)  (0.363)  (0.304) 
VOLD  0.540  0.826  ...  2.569  0.291  ... 
(0.334)  (0.503)  (0.508)  (0.150) 
VNOTEEN  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.414 
(1.664) 
VLANDVAL  ...  ...  0.833 
(0.345) 
VBIRTHS  3.136  -0.028  . . .  - 4.042  -  1.117  ... 
(2.188)  (1.803)  (1.748)  (0.558) 
VCOLL  ...  ...  ..  .  ...  ...  1.386 
(3.459) 
VFFARM  ...  ...  0.061  ...  ...  ... 
(0.080) 
VPINC  -0.027  0.040  0.045  0.020  0.017  -0.001 
(0.046)  (0.061)  (0.026)  (0.061)  (0.028)  (0.074) 
VlnHEAT  -0.145  0.345  0.128  0.122  0.280  0.175 
(0.103)  (0.107)  (0.049)  (0.116)  (0.068)  (0.117) 
VFLANDVAL  -  1.375  -  1.020  0.892  -0.567  - 0.425  -0.136 
(0.557)  (0.581)  (0.966)  (0.530)  (0.466)  (0.537) 
Log likelihood  137.083  103.805  160.387  99.444  142.181  126.236 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See text description  and table  A-2. 
a. Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
intercept  of monopoly  fixed  costs is FIXO,  and  that  of monopoly  variable 
profit,  VPO.  There  is a systematic  pattern  in which FIXD is large  when 
compared  to FIXO;  that  is, the estimated  F2  + B is much  larger  than  F,. 
The  difference  between  duopoly  and  monopoly  variable  profit,  however, 
is not significant  in most industries. In three industries  in table 2, we 
even had to constrain VPD to be zero to avoid predicting  monopoly 
profit  less than  duopoly  profit.35 
35. The estimation  procedures,  as well as the economic  logic, are adversely  affected 
if this  constraint  fails. See Bresnahan  and  Reiss, "Entry  in Monopoly  Markets." ->  III 
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The estimates for the professional industries are interpreted in 
table 3, which shows break-even  market  sizes and related  statistics. All 
the statistics in the table  are  reported  at two points. At the first  of these, 
Z and  W  are  evaluated  at  the mean  values  for  monopolies  in  each industry 
(denoted  by XM).  At the second, Z and W  are evaluated  at their overall 
sample  mean  (XT).  The  first  of these is our  preferred  measure;  it evaluates 
the function at both the margin  between no firm  and one firm  and the 
margin  between one firm  and two. We added the second primarily  to 
check if there was any important  variation within our sample in the 
economic  inferences. 
The first  row of table 3 shows that the town size needed to support  a 
single firm  varies widely among  professional  industries.  As one would 
expect, it takes far fewer people to support  a doctor or dentist than to 
support an optician. Similarly, the second row indicates substantial 
variation  in size of the market  needed to support  a duopoly. Comparing 
the XM  figures  with the  XT figures,  we note that  the point  in (Z, W)  space 
at which  the  functions  are  evaluated  matters  for some industries  (notably 
physicians). The point at which functions are evaluated, however, is 
basically  irrelevant  to the calculations  for most industries.  For most of 
these industries,  then, the effect of (Z, W)  in shifting  the profit  functions 
is economically  insignificant  despite the statistical  significance  of some 
variables.  Probably  as a result  of this, experiments  that  included  different 
variables  have little impact  on our  economic inferences.36 
The entry  threshold  ratios vary significantly  among  these industries. 
Auto dealers are an extreme case, as we suspected. They have by far 
the narrowest  range  of monopolies, requiring  a market  only 2.3 times 
larger  to support  a second firm.  Veterinarians  are at the other extreme, 
requiring  a market  more  than  4 times as large.  The remaining  industries, 
physicians,  dentists, druggists,  and  opticians,  are  remarkably  similar  on 
this measure:  each takes roughly  3 times as large a market  to support  a 
second firm. 
Table  4 gives the comparable  figures  for retail  industries.  Many  of the 
36. By experiments  with  the specification,  we mean  changes  in the list of covariates  in 
(Z, W)  for  all these industries  (in  results  not reported  here  but  available  from  us). For  auto 
dealers  we also  mean  very  extensive  experimentation  with  the  assumptions  about  the  error 
term  and  the model  reported  in Bresnahan  and  Reiss, "Entry  in Monopoly  Markets."  By 
economic  inferences,  we mean  inferences  about  the ratio  of break-even  market  sizes and 
about  the ratio  of monopoly  to duopoly  variable  profits. Timothy F.  Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  859 
Table 3.  Entry Thresholds for "Professional"  Industriesa 
Veteri-  Drulg-  Opti-  Auito 
Var-iableb  Physicians  Denttists  narians  stores  cians  dealers 
SM  (XM)  730  722  1,000  583  1,886  664 
SD (XM)  2,463  2,304  4,256  1,778  5,481  1,538 
SM  (XT)  552  632  1,008  467  1,885  664 
(153)  (173)  (277)  (101)  (282)  (135) 
SD(XT)  1,659  1,999  4,189  1,400  5,447  1,538 
(297)  (355)  (2,219)  (129)  (871)  (173) 
SDISM(XM)  3.378  3.195  4.255  3.040  2.907  2.315 
SDISM(XT)  3.012  3.164  4.149  2.994  2.890  2.315 
(1.07)  (.695)  (2.565)  (.663)  (.289)  (.364) 
VDIVM(XM)  .644  .864  .807  .901  .593  .631 
VD/VM  (XT)  .728  .879  .810  .920  .595  .631 
(.466)  (.508)  (3.538)  (.223)  (1.93)  (.430) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  XM refers to evaluation at monopoly  means of Z and W, XT to evaluation at sample means of Z and W. 
ETRs are smaller  than was typical of the professional  industries.  That 
for heating contractors is  below 2,  and those  of  all but electrical 
contractors, movie theaters, and tire dealers are below 2.7. Further, 
only the electrical  contractors'  is estimated  with any real  accuracy. 
Appendix table A-1 shows the number  of firms by market size for 
each industry.  The table cannot, of course, hold constant the influence 
of variables  other than  town population,  but it does make  clear that the 
boundaries  between the regions where there tend to be no, one, or two 
Table 4.  Entry Thresholds for "Retail"  Industriesa 
Cooling  Electsri-  Heating  Movie  Tire 
Variableb  Barbers  contractors  cians  contr-actors  Plumbers  theaters  dealers 
SM  (XM)  941.9  6958  1057  3014  1559  1985  618 
SD(XM)  2534.9  15313  3292  5315  3311  6000  1690 
SM (XT)  1003.8  8285  1040  3168  1507  1982  563 
(118)  (3290)  (244)  (419)  (207)  (231)  (223) 
SD (XT)  2672.1  20831  3242  5589  3226  5909  1539 
(1259.8)  (15195)  (473)  (2110)  (340)  (3927)  (621) 
SDISM(XM)  2.692  2.201  3.112  1.763  2.125  3.022  2.731 
SDISM(XT)  2.662  2.515  3.114  1.764  2.140  2.981  2.732 
(1.209)  (1.091)  (0.677)  (0.591)  (0.267)  (1.94)  (1.448) 
VDIVM(XT)  0.710  0.617  0.626  1.000  1.000  0.532  1.000 
(1.946)  (551.0)  (5.770)  .  .  .  .  .  .  (3.80)  .. 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  XM refers to evaluation at monopoly  means of Z and  W, X7 to evaluation  at sample means of Z and  W. 860  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
or more firms are clearly defined. Further, it suggests ETRs that are 
large  in  exactly those industries  for  which  we have  estimated  large  ratios. 
Our  experiments  with the definition  of S(  ) for the veterinarians  and 
farm  equipment  sales are given in tables 5 and 6. For the veterinarians, 
we report  three  more  specifications.  In  the first  column,  S( ) is FARMS40/ 
TPOP (TPOP  +  XIOPOP  +  X2OCTY +  X3NGRW  +  X4PGRW),  so that 
the lead term in S( ) is the number  of farms  with sales over $40,000. In 
the second column the lead term is TPOP, just as in the earlier  tables; 
however, horses and  cows per square  mile are  included  in S. In the third 
column  the lead term  is still TPOP, and all of the other  variables  in S(Y) 
are animals  per square  mile. It is clear  from  the likelihoods  that a blend 
specification  involving  both TPOP and some measure  of the importance 
of large  farm animals  is best at predicting  the number  of active veteri- 
narians. The entry threshold ratio appears somewhat specification- 
dependent.  The  overall  effect of these changes  in specification  is to lower 
the estimated ETR, making  veterinarians  less unusual among profes- 
sions. 
DECOMPOSITION 
Like all discrete  dependent  variable  methods, ours can estimate  only 
the parameters  of the profit  functions  up to scale. This is not troubling, 
since all  the  interesting  statistics  are  ratios  of parameters.  The  quantities, 
S, are themselves ratios of parameters,  and it is obvious that VD/VM  is 
unchanged  when the functions  are  rescaled. Even ratios, however, may 
be somewhat  dependent  on functional  form, as the literature  on semi- 
parametric inference emphasizes.3 
These econometric  points lead to another  attractive  feature of esti- 
mating  SD/SM: the information  in the data  that led to an inference  about 
this quantity  was clear. When  the interval  of market  sizes that typically 
have monopoly is wide, the estimated ETR will be large. Given the 
importance  of the size of the market  as an explainer  of the number  of 
firms, the width of the typical monopoly  market-size  interval  is largely 
determined  by data  rather  than  by econometric  specification.  However, 
our decomposition of  SDISM into fixed and variable profits factors 
(following equation 5) cannot be so lightly defended. It may well be 
affected  by functional  form  assumptions  about  the error  distribution. 
37. Cosslett, "Distribution-Free  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimator." Timothy F. Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  861 
Table  5. Incidence  of Veterinariansa 
Independent  Coefficieits 
variable  1  2  3 
OPOP  -  2.070  ...  ... 
(1.271) 
NGRW  -  3.234  - 0.567  ... 
(5.645)  (1.750) 
PGRW  10.383  - 0.361  ... 
(8.101)  (0.643) 
OCTY  0.519 
(0.578) 
HORSES  ...  1.374  1.255 
(0.794)  (0.795) 
COWS  . . .  1.970  2.186 
(1.157)  (1.25) 
PIGS  . .  .  .  .  .  0.137 
(1.894) 
SHEEP  ...  ...  0.004 
(0.016) 
VPO  6.701  - 0.525  - 0.449 
(8.448)  (0.386)  (0.335) 
VPD  1.337  0.255  0.274 
(1.139)  (0.106)  (0.101) 
FIXO  0.357  1.112  1.10 
(0.267)  (0.378)  (0.384) 
FIXD  0.973  0.769  0.697 
(0.216)  (0.333)  (0.331) 
VLANDVAL  1.170  0.387  0.415 
(2.512)  (0.260)  (0.248) 
VFFRAC  -  1.525  - 0.046  - 0.048 
(1.471)  (0.078)  (0.073) 
VPINC  0.874  0.042  0.035 
(0.519)  (0.022)  (0.018) 
VInHEAT  -  0.862  0.091  0.085 
(0.890)  (0.044)  (0.039) 
FLANDVAL  -  0.411  - 0.037  0.059 
(0.557)  (0.753)  (0.753) 
Log likelihood  -182.421  -155.10  -155.31 
SD/SAI  7.94  3.012  3.064 
(0.710)  (1.130)  (1.110) 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description  and table A-2. 
a.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Tables  3 and  4 show  the ratio  of duopoly  to monopoly  variable  profits. 
There are several problems with these statistics. We have already 
suggested  that the decomposition  will depend more on the functional 
form  of the  error  (be  less robust)  than  will  the ETRs  themselves. Further, 862  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Table 6.  Incidence of Farm Equipment Dealersa 
Independent  Independent 
variable  Coefficients  variable  Coefficients 
OFARM  -0.888  FIXD  0.573 
(0.221)  (0.221) 
NGRW  -1.400  VLANDVAL  12.034 
(1.498)  (7.291) 
PGRW  1.615  VFFRAC  4.735 
(1.246)  (2.502) 
NFARMS2  0.058  VPINC  0.057 
(0.108)  (0.656) 
VPO  11.598  VlnHEAT  -1.006 
(17.256)  (1.755) 
VPD  -1.330  FLANDVAL  0.053 
(1.476)  (0.764) 
FIXO  1.138  Log likelihood  -154.102 
(0.307)  SD/SM  1.726 
(0.131) 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
we  note from the tables that the ratios of the variable profits are 
imprecisely  estimated,  even given our  functional  form. For three  indus- 
tries we cannot estimate them at all. Thus any interpretation  of the 
decomposition  will be very tentative.38 
The most obvious regularity  in the estimates of VDIVM  is that they 
exceed  0.5,  sometimes substantially. Since in an industry without 
product  differentiation  this ratio must be less than or equal to 0.5, the 
excess is striking.39  Few of these ratios  were precisely  estimated,  so that 
it was not  possible  to reject  0.5. Nonetheless, the point  estimates  implied 
(following  the logic of the decomposition)  that F2  +  B >  F1. That is, 
simply reading the decomposition literally would assign most of the 
difference between monopoly and duopoly profits to the fixed costs 
portion,  not to a fall in variable  profits. 
38. The primary  reason  for not reporting  nonprobit  specifications  can now be stated. 
Even when we made  strong  functional  form  assumptions,  the decomposition  was impre- 
cisely estimated.  Thus the value of exploring  the even greater  imprecision  that can be 
obtained  by making  weaker  assumptions  was small.  Based  on our  substantial  experiments 
with  the auto  dealer  case, it is likely  that  experimentation  with  the kinds  of error  structures 
described  in note 32 would  change  the  point  estimates  of VDI/VM  substantially.  It is unlikely 
that  such experimentation  would  alter  the estimated  ETRs. 
39. Even if there is no increase  in competition  between monopoly  and duopoly, VD 
should  be only 0.5 x  VM  in such  industries;  then  the two firms'  variable  profits  will sum  to 
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Of  course, a decrease  in variable  profits  can arise  if there  is substantial 
product  differentiation,  which will have two effects. First, the second 
firm  will broaden  the customer  base by offering  a second product, and 
second, behavior  is likely to be less competitive  when firms  sell slightly 
different  products.  Our  conclusion is tentatively  that duopolies are not 
particularly  competitive in these industries, possibly because of the 
existence of product  differentiation. 
MARKET  DEFINITION  TESTS 
If the variable  OCTY were consistently negative and significant  we 
would infer that there is a leakage  problem  with our market  definition. 
Consider  the  coefficient  in the physicians  column  of table 1,  which  shows 
that every out-of-county  commuter  means one-half (0.519) fewer cus- 
tomers  for physicians  in town. This is not an implausible  level for this 
variable. It certainly does not suggest that those areas economically 
connected to  neighboring  areas (as measured by commuting) have 
dramatically  more competition  from outside. Most of the OCTY coeffi- 
cients are like this: smaller  than 1.0 in absolute value and insignificant. 
The two times in table 1 that OCTY does turn  up large and reasonably 
precisely estimated (for veterinarians  and optometrists)  it is positive. 
The one large  (if insignificant)  negative  coefficient  occurs  for the cooling 
contractors.  These estimates, mostly small numbers,  imprecisely  esti- 
mated, and varying  among industries,  do not seem to suggest that we 
have any important  problems  of geographic  market  definition. 
Further  evidence on the accuracy  of market  definition  can be found 
in table  7, which  uses what  we call the unisolated  sample  to estimate  the 
modelforphysicians  and  dentists  .40This  sample  consisted  of 194  counties 
with populations  under 10,000.  It met the selection criteria  for our 149- 
county  subsample,  except that town 1 was not required  to be geograph- 
ically isolated. In the unisolated  sample, OCTY is large, negative, and 
significant  for both professions. This means that markets  that have a 
large number  of out-of-county commuters systematically have fewer 
firms. 
This  additional  finding  can be interpreted  to place our  regular  sample 
in the context of figure  2. In the regular  sample  of isolated  places, there 
40. The dependent  variable  here is the American  Medical  Association  or American 
Dental  Association  count  of certified  practitioners  that  we described  earlier. 864  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Table 7.  Effects of Population Variables on Number of Physicians and Dentists, 
"Unisolated"  Samplea 
Independent 
variable  Physicians  Dentists 
OPOP  .447  .773 
(.123)  (.151) 
NGRW  .169  -.773 
(.561)  (.694) 
PGRW  -.035  -.401 
(.245)  (.238) 
OCTY  -  2.069  -  2.690 
(.748)  (.885) 
VPO  .848  .550 
(.214)  (.108) 
VPD  0  0 
(0)  (0) 
FIXO  .803  1.064 
(.281)  (.260) 
FIXD  .882  1.363 
(.352)  (.351) 
SM(XT)  947  1,936 
(220)  (310) 
SD(XT)  1,988  4,415 
(1,078)  (.486) 
SD/SM  2.099  2.280 
(.546)  (.126) 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description and table A-2. 
a.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
was no tendency  for closeness (as measured  by OCTY) to predict  fewer 
firms. When we extended the sample to include less isolated places, 
such a tendency  became marked.  These two results together  imply  that 
our regular  sample  is to the right  of D** in figure  2, where competition 
from  other  places exerts little effect. Less isolated places must  then fall 
between  D* and  D** in the figure. 
UNDERSTANDING  INDUSTRY  DIFFERENCES 
The  marked  differences  in entry  threshold  ratios  between  professional 
and retail industries confirmed our opinion that the two groups are 
distinct. Our division into two groups seemed a priori to reflect real 
economic differences.  The professional  group  has large  fixed, possibly 
sunk, costs. The other industries  may also, but the case is harder  to 
prove. Our  empirical  finding  is weak evidence that industries  with large Timothy F. Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  865 
fixed  and sunk  costs have little entry. Of course, many  have speculated 
that  sunk  assets are critical  in the theory  of barriers  to entry. 
There are, however, several exceptions to this rule. Automobile 
dealers  appear  to belong in the retail  group,  given the high  frequency  of 
entry into monopoly markets. Electrical contractors, movie theaters, 
and  tire  dealers  appear  (at their  point  estimates, at least)  to belong  in the 
infrequent-entry  group. Finally, veterinarians  appear  to stand  out, in at 
least some specifications,  as having  very little  entry.  The obvious  reason 
is that  movie  theaters  have substantial  fixed  and  sunk  costs, though  they 
are physical, not human, capital. Thus this industry could easily be 
classified  into  the other  category,  thereby  reinforcing  the point  that  large 
fixed  and sunk  costs restrict  entry. 
The results  for tire dealers and electrical  contractors  frankly  baffled 
us. Why  should  tire  dealers  have less entry  than  car  dealers?  Why  should 
electrical  contractors  be so different  from  heating,  cooling, and  plumbing 
contractors?  Perhaps  there is a ready source of entrants  into heating, 
cooling, and plumbing contracting from the other two  contracting 
categories. But this explanation  still leaves quite a few electrical con- 
tracting  monopolies  unexplained.  Similarly,  it is not obvious why auto 
dealers  and veterinarians  stand  out. 
We have no quantitative  information  about  the level of sunk costs in 
these industries.  We are not particularly  concerned, however, that we 
are  unable  to provide  a complete  explanation  of interindustry  variations 
in the ETR.  The primary  conclusion  must  be, after  all, that  industries  do 
differ.  By construction,  the ETR accounts for scale economy explana- 
tions of monopoly.  Thus interindustry  variation  in the ETR necessarily 
means that there is interindustry  variation  in the impact of strategic 
forces on entry. 
A  FAILING  EXPLANATION 
Since  the variations  in ETRs  among  industries  appear  to be driven  by 
fixed  costs, we searched  for explanations  from governmental  forces as 
well as forces inside  the local market.  Effective governmental  licensure 
or  restrictions  on entry  should  have  appeared  in our  results  as an  increase 
in the fixed costs of both the first and the second firm  into the market: 
state government  licensure  regulations  typically do not block the entry 
of the second  firm  into a particular  local market  any more  than  the first. 
However,  there  might  be some subtle  effects of governmental  limitations 866  Brookings Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
on mobility  that account  for lack of entry into the  sample monopoly 
markets. 
The impact of government  regulation on entry into the professions 
and  on  professional  mobility  has  been  analyzed  in  the  substantial 
literature on occupational  licensure.  B. Peter Pashigian has examined 
the effects  of licensure  on a great many occupations.  Table 8 includes 
information from his study about the extent of licensure.41 It is certainly 
hard  to  conclude  on  this  basis  that  variations  in  licensure  among 
occupations  explain  the differences  in ETRs  across  industries  in our 
sample.  Veterinarians,  for example,  pass  B.  Peter  Pashigian's  more 
stringent standard, as do most of the occupations  we considered,  but 
they  are  not  among  the  occupations  that  have  particularly  limited 
reciprocity among the states. 
Pashigian also provides some evidence  about the inter- and intrastate 
mobility  behavior  of  the  occupations.42 Those  of  our industries  that 
Pashigian covers are ordered from most mobile to least mobile as follows: 
Intrastate  Interstate 
Electricians  Electricians 
Plumbers  Physicians 
Hairdressers  Plumbers 
Barbers  Opticians 
Dentists  Dentists 
Opticians  Hairdressers 
Pharmacists  Barbers 
Optometrists  Optometrists 
Physicians  Pharmacists 
This would seem to suggest that pharmacists and optometrists have the 
largest barriers to entry, since they stand out as the least mobile within 
or among states. Electricians are hardly the candidates for firms encoun- 
tering high entry barriers; they are the most mobile on both accounts. 
We conclude that we are unlikely to find an explanation of the apparent 
variation in barriers to entry from mobility barriers. 
It seems,  then,  that the government-based  theory  of the  variation 
41. B. Peter  Pashigian,  "Has Occupational  Licensing  Reduced  Geographical  Mobility 
and Raised Earnings?" in Simon Rottenberg, ed., OccupationalLicensure  andRegulation 
(Washington,  D.C.: American  Enterprise  Institute,  1980),  pp. 299-333. 
42. The relevant  evidence  is in his table  8. Pashigian  estimates  equations  in which  the 
dependent  variables  are  the logs of migration  rates,  both  intra-  and  interstate.  We ordered 
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Table 8.  Industry Profiles and Regulation 
Numbera  People  Reglulatoty  Reglulatoty 
Industry  offirms  perfilrmb  standardc  reciprocity ?d 
Doctorse  58,305  4,142  1  Y 
Dentists  147,632  1,636  I  N 
Pharmacists  55,473  4,353  I  Y 
Veterinarians  42,053  5,742  I  Y 
Optometrists  30,465  7,927  I  Y 
Opticians  15,699  15,382  II  Y 
Auto dealers  27,315  8,841  n.a.  n.a. 
Tire dealers 
Retail  43,088  5,605  n.a.  n.a. 
Used  2,225  108,534  n.a.  n.a. 
Theaters  11,919  20,261  n.a.  n.a. 
Contractors 
Cooling  46,563  5,186  n.a.  n.a. 
Plumbing  51,704  4,671  II  N 
Heating  43,668  5,530  n.a.  n.a. 
Electrical  52,239  4,623  II  N 
Barbers  65,801  3,670  I  N 
Beauticians  203,652  1,186  I  N 
Sources:  Number  in each  profession  is  from American  Business  Lists,  Inc.  People  per firm is  computed  using 
U.S.  population data from Bureau of the Census,  Statistical  Abstract  of the Uniited States,  1987 (U.S.  Department 
of  Commerce,  1987), p.  8,  table  2.  Regulatory  standards and  regulatory reciprocity  are from  B.  Peter  Pashigian, 
"Has  Occupational  Licensing  Reduced  Geographical  Mobility  and Raised  Earnings?'  in Simon  Rottenberg,  ed., 
Occuipational Licentsure and Regulation  (Washington,  D.C.:  American Enterprise  InstituLte,  1980), pp. 299-333. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Number as of June 1987. 
b.  U.S.  population estimate  for 1986 divided by number of firms. 
c.  Standard I is a  more restrictive  definition of  regulation than  standard 11. See  Pashigian,  "Has  Occupational 
Licensing  Reduced  Geographical Mobility?"  table 2. 
d.  N means restrictions on reciprocity;  Y means few  restrictions on reciprocity.  See  Pashigian, table 2. 
e.  In general practice. 
among  industries  is weak. Though  government  regulations  affect mobil- 
ity, they  do not  seem  to create  disproportionately  more  local  monopolies. 
Conclusion 
The industries  in our sample showed important  differences  in entry 
threshold  ratios and therefore in their tendency to monopoly. Some, 
primarily  the retail  ones in our sample,  appear  to have little tendency  to 
monopoly.  Others, such as the health professions, have higher ETRs 
and tend more toward  monopoly. The degree to which costs are sunk 
provides  a potential  explanation  of much of these differences, on the 
plausible  theory  that  professionals  have greater  sunk  costs. 868  Brookings Papers  oni Econiomic Activity,  3:1987 
Some but not all of the tendency toward concentrated industry 
structure  is explained  by economies of scale. As an empirical  matter, 
the remaining  variation  in ETRs cannot easily be explained  by govern- 
mental  intervention,  nor  is it a result  of flawed  market  definition.  Instead, 
the  explanation  must  lie in  differences  in the competitiveness  of duopoly, 
in the effectiveness of entry  barriers,  or in the relative  efficiencies  of the 
first  and second firms  into markets. 
Since our sample consisted of local markets,  it is hard  to argue  that 
systematic differences in efficiency between the first and second firm 
are  an  explanation  for  our  results.  The  other  two explanations,  variations 
in  entry  barriers  across  concentrated  industries  or  in  competitive  conduct 
after  entry, are of considerable  importance  in a broader  context than  the 
local markets  we studied. We do not believe that these markets  "stand 
in" for highly concentrated  industries  in the sectors of the economy 
where competition is national or global. In recent years, however, 
antitrust  policy debates have been heavily influenced  by the view that 
most industries  have very free entry. Our  results show that that view is 
incorrect as an empirical  matter;  industries  vary dramatically  in their 
entry conditions. Thus continued  investigation  of the ease of entry and 
the competitive  effects of entry  is an important  research  area. 
Appendix Tables 
Table A-1.  Number of Professional Firms, by Size of Town 
Town popiulationi 
Less  Mo,  e 
Number  than  250-  500-  1,000-  1,500-  2,000-  2,500-  3,000-  3,500-  thlan 
of firms  250  500  1,000  1,500  2,000  2,500  3,000  3,500  5,000  5,000  Total 
Dentists 
0  3  7  14  5  1  0  1  1  0  0  32 
1  0  2  17  23  12  6  4  2  1  0  67 
2 or more  0  0  2  6  6  9  4  11  22  43  103 
Plumbers 
0  2  9  25  18  8  1  3  3  1  1  71 
I  1  0  7  13  6  9  2  2  4  3  47 
2 or more  0  0  1  3  5  5  4  9  18  39  84 
Heating contractors 
0  3  9  28  25  14  11  4  5  11  7  117 
1  0  0  4  9  3  2  3  5  7  7  40 
2 or more  0  0  1  0  2  2  2  4  5  29  45 Timothy F. Bresnahan  and Pete)  C. Reiss  869 
Table A-1.  (continued) 
Towvn  populationi 
Less  Mor  e 
Number  than  250-  500-  1,000-  1,500-  2,000-  2,500-  3,000-  3,500-  than 
of firms  250  500  1,000  1,500  2,000  2,500  3,000  3,500  5,000  5,000  Total 
Cooling contractors 
0  3  9  30  33  15  13  7  13  1  1  19  153 
1  0  0  3  1  3  2  1  0  6  14  30 
2 or more  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  6  10  19 
Electrical contractors 
0  3  8  19  15  7  3  1  2  2  0  60 
1  0  1  9  13  7  7  2  3  8  4  54 
2 or more  0  0  5  6  5  5  6  9  13  39  88 
Beauty  shops 
0  1  3  5  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  10 
1  2  4  8  9  1  1  0  0  1  0  26 
2 or more  0  2  20  25  17  14  9  14  22  43  166 
Barber shops 
0  3  8  28  20  12  6  4  5  5  4  95 
1  0  1  5  12  6  7  3  6  14  12  66 
2 oi  more  0  0  0  2  1  2  2  3  4  27  41 
Farm equipment dealers 
0  3  7  20  19  7  3  4  5  11  11  90 
1  0  2  8  7  5  4  1  3  3  6  39 
2 or more  0  0  5  8  7  8  4  6  9  26  73 
Optometrists 
0  3  9  32  32  19  14  8  14  17  25  173 
1  0  0  1  2  0  1  1  0  5  9  19 
2 or niore  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  9  10 
Drugstores 
0  3  7  15  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  28 
1  0  2  14  26  9  4  3  1  3  0  62 
2 or more  0  0  4  7  9  11  6  12  20  43  112 
Physicians 
0  3  8  12  9  4  0  1  0  0  0  37 
1  0  1  17  13  7  7  3  7  3  3  61 
2 or more  0  0  4  12  8  8  5  7  20  40  104 
Opticians 
0  2  8  26  16  7  2  3  2  2  0  68 
I  1  1  7  17  1  1  12  4  9  12  1  1  85 
2 or more  0  0  0  1  1  1  2  3  9  32  49 
Tire dealers 
0  2  8  15  14  3  1  0  1  0  1  45 
I  I  1  13  11  2  3  2  3  3  0  39 
2 ormore  0  0  5  9  14  11  7  10  20  42  118 
Veterinarians 
0  2  9  20  10  3  2  1  3  2  1  53 
1  1  0  12  19  14  7  5  4  8  10  80 
2 or more  0  0  1  5  2  6  3  7  13  32  69 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  with  data  from  American  Business  Lists. 870  Brookings  Papers  on  Economi2ic Activity,  3:1987 
Table A-2.  Sample Statistics 
Standard  Mini-  Maxi- 
Variable  Mean  deviation  mum  mum 
Dentists (TDENTIST)  2.6  3.1  0  17 
Plumbers  (TPLUMB)  2.2  3.3  0  25 
Heating  contractors  (THEAT)  1.0  1.7  0  11 
Cooling  contractors  (TCOOL)  0.4  0.8  0  4 
Electricians  (TELECT)  2.2  2.9  0  18 
Beauty shops (TBEAUTY)  6.0  5.8  0  32 
Barber  shops (TBARBER)  0.9  1.2  0  5 
Farm  equipment  dealers  (TFARM)  1.5  2.0  0  15 
Optometrists  (TOPTOM)  0.2  0.7  0  4 
Drugstores  (TDRUG)  1.9  1.6  0  11 
Physicians  (TDOCTOR)  3.4  5.4  0  45 
Opticians  (TOPTIC)  1.0  1.0  0  5 
Tire dealers  (TTIRE)  2.6  2.6  0  13 
Veterinarians  (TVET)  1.3  1.2  0  8 
Theaters  (THEATERS)  0.9  1.0  0  4 
Auto dealers  (TCARD)  2.0  1.6  0  11 
County Data 
Land area (sq. miles)  (LAND)  2,806.9  3,008.9  407  18,155 
County  population  (POP80)  17,423.0  106,553.0  513  1,509,052 
Female population  (FEMALE80)  8,774.1  54,306.5  247  769,261 
Moved within  state-different county 
(CMOVE80)  1,099.9  2,771.8  77  36,728 
Moved out of state (SMOVE80)  3,519.0  26,999.6  39  382,163 
Population  65 and older  (OLD80)  2,013.3  12,311.4  64  174,732 
Population  18 and older  (NOTEEN80)  12,173.6  76,544.1  377  1,085,178 
Median  age (MEDAGE80)  31.4  4.7  21  49 
Total families  (FAMILIES)  4,568.3  28,055.7  148  397,610 
Households  with female head 
(AFAMFEM)  481.1  3,407.0  7  48,266 
Number  births 1980  (BIRTHS)  332.3  1,897.1  6  26,761 
Number  died 1980  (DEATHS)  145.5  830.2  3  11,769 
Housing  units (HOUSES)  7,318.7  43,114.8  233  610,772 
Worked  outside county 1980  (OCTY)  318.9  688.0  2  8,387 
Population  25 or older 
with college (COLL)  1,498.0  11,345.5  27  161,232 
Households 1980  (HHOLD80)  6,139.8  38,454.5  210  545,503 Timothy F. Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  871 
Table  A-2. (continued) 
Standard  Mini-  Maxi- 
Variable  Mean  deviation  mum  mum 
Median  household  income ($) 
(MEDHINC)  13,562.4  2,899.7  7,358  26,060 
Per capita  income ($) (PINC)  5,908.5  1,132.4  3,159  10,504 
Total families 1980  (TOTFAM80)  4,614.2  28,231.6  153  400,084 
Paid employment  of retail  trade 
(RETEMP)  965.1  6,504.9  11  91,853 
Annual  payroll  of retail  trade 
($ millions)  (RETPAY)  5,943.7  42,108.1  33  594,696 
Retail sales 1980  ($ thousands) 
(RETSAL80)  52,887.0  341,073.9  341  4,835,775 
Percent  of land in farms  (FFARM)  67.05  35.09  0  127.2 
Farms  with sales of $2,500  or more 
(FARMS2)  339.5  248.5  0  1,434 
Farms  with sales of $40,000  or more 
(FARMS40)  133.7  112.6  0  775 
Per farm  land value ($) (FARMVAL)  602,994.4  504,454.7  42,500  3,889,666 
Per acre farm  value ($) (FLANDVAL)  294.6  226.3  73  1,635 
Hundreds  of animals  (PIGS)  46.4  93.9  0.00  621.780 
Hundreds  of animals  (COWS)  504.8  412.3  0.00  2,752.030 
Hundreds  of animals  (SHEEP)  143.7  269.5  0.00  1,857.900 
Hundreds  of animals  (HORSES)  9.54  11.2  0.00  86.580 
Log (heating  degree  days)a  (lnHEAT)  8.59  0.472  6.83  9.200 
Log (cooling  degrees days)a  (lnCOOL)  6.72  0.732  4.67  8.353 
Payroll  ($/1,000)  employees 
(RETWAG)  5.37  1.701  2.53  8.708 
Town  Data 
1980  population  of town 1 (TPOP)  3,744.2  5,350.7  124  45,086 
Nearby  population  (OPOP)  410.7  741.7  11.0  5,844.9 
Negative part  of town 1 population 
growth  (NGRW)  - 57.0  145  -1,345  0 
Positive  part  of town 1 population  growth 
(PGRW)  490.0  1,051.0  0  7,229 
Sources:  Industry data from ABL;  county  and town data from U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  Coiunty anid City Data 
Book, 1983 (U.S.  Department of Commerce),  tables B and C. 
a.  Heating degree days  is the total over  days  of the  year of the  number of degrees  one  would  need to increase 
temperature up to a standard; cooling  degree  days  is  similar.  We classify  heating degree  days  and cooling  degree 
days as county data even though these  are actually defined for cities.  We associate  with each sample point the value 
of these variables for the nearest city of population 25,000 or greater. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert  Willig: This  paper  is enormously  rich, stimulating,  and  creative; 
I believe it will  have a significant  effect on how we think  about  industries. 
The major  contribution  of the paper  is the idea  of threshold  market  sizes, 
the entry  threshold  ratio.  At first,  ETRs  seem a little  alien,  but  estimating 
them  will very soon become  a cottage  industry  for  empirical  researchers. 
My major  criticism  of the paper  is its conclusion.  The authors  say that 
where the entry threshold ratio is larger than two, there are entry 
problems. And where the ETR is just two,  so that the firms have 
presumably divided the market fifty-fifty, price is  unchanged from 
monopoly  to duopoly, and  the market  is twice the size of that  necessary 
to support  a single firm. In such a case there is no entry barrier  at all, 
and  there  is a "good market." 
I am baffled at this conclusion. The model has a fixed cost and a 
constant  marginal  cost thereafter,  so there  are  globally  increasing  returns 
to scale or natural-monopoly  cost conditions. The authors  deliberately 
make  this assumption,  and  they support  it by arguing  that  these are small 
markets or that fixed costs are going to be important  in this kind of 
market.  I accept that. 
Of course, where there is natural monopoly and a homogeneous 
product, cost efficiency calls for one firm, not many. But having only 
one firm  may mean  that it might  very well price in an ugly way. And we 
all  know  that  there  are  trade-offs  in  our  familiar  oligopoly  models  between 
the cost inefficiencies of several firms and the beneficial effects on 
pricing. 
Roger Koenker and Martin  Perry develop the welfare measures  for 
lots of familiar  oligopoly  models, using  familiar  functional  forms.  i Their 
1.  Roger W. Koenker  and Martin K.  Perry, "Product Differentiation,  Monopolistic 
Competition,  and  Public  Policy,"  Bell  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  12 (Spring  1981), 
pp. 217-31. 
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numbers  uniformly  show a tendency toward  free entry, leading to too 
many firms  from the point of view of overall social welfare. In these 
kinds  of models,  free entry  means  that  entry  proceeds  until  the next firm, 
if it were to join,  could no longer cover its costs in the postentry 
equilibrium.  It is not hit-and-run  entry. It is just that  the entrants  join in 
the current  mode  of behavior  and  do not upset the applecart,  except that 
they increase  N by one, so entry  is conditional  on the number  of firms  in 
postentry  equilibrium. 
It is that  kind  of world  that  Koenker  and  Perry  find:  too many  firms  in 
free entry. But that  is the very idea that  underlies  this paper.  If the ETR 
is four, for example, then it takes a market  four times as big as the 
monopoly-threshold  market  to support  a second firm,  using  the conven- 
tional  idea of free entry. Thus if the authors  had a market  with an ETR 
of four, they would  decry the absence of a second firm.  If the town were 
only three  times as big as the threshold-monopoly  town, they would say 
it has an unfortunate  monopoly, whereas in a normal  oligopoly model 
an ETR  of four  would still encourage  free entry. 
So, I am baffled about this paper's intuition, even from the very 
standard  framework  of oligopoly theory, from the point of view of the 
normative  side. 
I would  like to discuss the kinds  of ETRs  one would  expect in different 
kinds of industries, drawing  on some other conventional models, or 
models  that  I find  conventional,  and  to begin  to enrich  our  intuition  about 
what  is a good  or a bad  ETR  and  under  what  conditions  one would  expect 
to see it be greater  than  two, equal  to two, or whatever. 
If  the  world  is perfectly  competitive,  one must  try  to find  a competitive 
structure  for these little towns. There may well be only one auto dealer 
in town. It is a very small  town, but  people can drive 150  miles roundtrip 
to other  towns where  there  may be a dealer  offering  the same brand  or a 
different  brand.  A drive of 200 miles roundtrip  may even put them in 
range  of a town with two auto dealers. The pricing  behavior  of the auto 
dealer  in the small  town is obviously constrained  by the possibility  that 
people will drive 200 miles to save a fat monopoly  margin  on a $10,000 
car. That  is a reasonable  trip  to take. 
Different  markets,  of course, will have different  degrees of cost for 
out-of-town  consumers.  Different  products  will correspond  to different 
shopping  costs, relative  to how much money consumers  can expect to 
save. In some markets, a product will just be too expensive. Such a 874  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
situation  will constrain  the monopoly. In other markets  it may be quite 
constraining.  So, other towns are relevant, at least for lots of these 
goods. And, considering  that the monopoly  level of profit  in one-dealer 
towns may be small  relative  to the duopoly  level of profit,  which would 
mean that the ETR is predictably  two with no change, or very little, 
between monopoly and duopoly profit, the town that is twice as large 
will have twice as many  firms.  An ETR of two is thus consistent with a 
very competitive  situation. 
For cars, then, one would expect a low ETR. People are willing to 
drive to get better prices. Veterinarians,  however, may be a different 
story. Can  a veterinarian  located 150  miles away be induced  to attend  a 
sick cow? Probably  not. Or  the case may  prove very expensive. Can  the 
cow be delivered  to the vet? It may be difficult  to move a sick cow. The 
monopoly level is thus probably  high in towns with one veterinarian 
relative  to those with a duopoly  because there  is no threat  from  adjacent 
markets,  suggesting  a big  ETR. And  that  is what  the authors  have  found. 
Again, when my electricity  goes down, it is an emergency. I will not 
go looking  for an electrician,  nor  am I willing  to call a town one-hundred 
miles away to get one. I am bound to my local electrician  for repairing 
electrical failures. This suggests a high ETR because monopoly and 
duopoly  locally  would  be quite  different.  But contrast  this situation  with 
an airconditioning  problem.  A person can live with an extra  ten degrees 
of heat in a house or an office, so he can wait for some airconditioning 
technician  to come in from another  town when the technician  has free 
time. This would  lead to a much  smaller  ETR. 
What  if instead  of a perfectly  competitive  situation,  we have  a  perfectly 
contestable  situation?  An average  cost (AC)  curve (figure  1) essentially 
bottoms  out. Call  it  MES.  It does not  turn  up  because  we want  to preserve 
the idea of some kind  of global  nondecreasing  returns  to scale. The level 
of the market  at which monopoly first  becomes able to cover its costs 
corresponds  to this  demand  curve. As one expands  these demand  curves 
radially,  which is what this paper  does, at the first  radial  expansion the 
market  will support  two firms,  given  that  the market  remains  contestable. 
The answer  is a double  MES. That  is the first  level of market  expansion, 
at which one can actually  see duopoly. SM corresponds  to this demand 
curve, and it is quite  general  for this shape of average  cost curve. It will 
make the ETR be significantly  greater  than two because two MES is 
twice as big as one MES. By the Chamberlinian  argument,  one MES is 
well larger  than  the tangency  point  where  monopoly  can first  cover cost. Timothy F. Bresnahan  and Peter  C. Reiss  875 
Figure 1.  Contestability and Market Entry 
AC 
SM\  II 
1  MES  2MES 
As soon as demand  is big enough to allow the firm  to cover costs on 
the flat  portion  of the average  cost (AC) curve, then in this contestable 
world the price will be down at the flat and the firm  will be operating 
along that portion. So, the ETR is significantly  greater  than two. How 
much  greater  depends upon the shape of the downward  slope and part 
of the average cost curve. There is thus a high ETR, perfectly free 
entry-in  the contestable  sense, not the oligopoly sense-and  all along 
the way pushing  the price  up. 
What this shows is that a model can have large ETRs and no entry 
barriers  at all: "4ultra  free entry" as a friend  once said. 
Equations  from  the  entry  model  of Richard  Gilbert  and  Richard  Harris 
provide a way to accommodate  a situation such as the following  .2 If 
small towns are growing or their economic activity is growing, in an 
early  stage  of the growth  they may have no firms  in a market.  Later  they 
may have one and later yet, two. When  does the monopoly  firm  enter? 
At a time determined  by the size of the market  but also by perfectly 
anticipated  realization  that duopoly will occur later. Given the linear 
framework,  it is easy to do the analytics  of Gilbert  and Harris  and  get an 
expression  for the relationship  between the ETR and the ratio  between 
2.  Richard J. Gilbert and Richard G. Harris, "Competition with Lumpy Investment," 
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monopoly-flow  profit  and duopoly-flow  profit.  There, too, if the growth 
rate  is zero or tends to zero, the formulas  collapse to the static  formulas 
that Timothy Bresnahan  and Peter Reiss show in their paper. But the 
more growth  there is in the market,  the smaller  the ETR for any given 
ratio  of monopoly  profit  to duopoly  profit.  The more  growth  there  is, the 
more  competitive  the firms  can be in duopoly  and  yet still  create  an ETR 
equal  to two. 
Finally, if one takes the Gilbert  and Harris  world and assumes that 
capacity does not increase in an uneven manner, which is the way 
Gilbert-Harris  works, but  that  instead  incumbent  firms  increase  capacity 
in a more slow and continuous fashion, then the incumbent has an 
incentive  to overbuild  capacity  or to preempt  in the building  of capacity 
in a way that  will tend to discourage  even efficient  entrants. 
Now, what does that take in this model? It takes the ability to sink 
volume-sensitive  costs, variable  costs, the marginal  costs of the model. 
In industries  where the variable  costs are committed,  one would expect 
less entry, higher  ETRs, and there would be enormous  significance  of 
bad performance  from large ETRs. Consider movie theaters that can 
add screens to show yet more  movies and  thereby  deter  the entry  of new 
theaters  under  independent  management.  Such an action would tend to 
increase  the ETR, and movie theaters  have a large  ETR  as I recall. 
Perhaps  veterinarians  can hire  helpers  without  bumping  into  the same 
constraints  that  physicians  bump  into and can expand  capacity  to serve 
in a more flexible way, steering  clear of the restraints  of the law. This 
might  lead them to have a very high  ETR. 
My main point is to praise this paper because the empirical  picture 
that ETRs point to stimulates  imagining  such situations. Moreover, if 
other  information  about  industries  were available-if there  were plenary 
data  or even less formal  information,  such as what a minimum  efficient 
scale is or how far people will go to shop or how firms  actually  behave 
as an industry grows in a town-one  might see whether incumbents 
make small capacity additions. If such information  were added to the 
ETRs, one could really begin to separate  out the stories, I think, in a 
very powerful  way. 
George J.  Stigler: In an age when so many problems of industrial 
organization  are solved with a hypothetical matrix of payoffs, it is 
pleasant to find Timothy Bresnahan and Peter Reiss employing an 
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However,  their  theoretical  model  seems so close to the characteristics 
they find  in the retailing  of automobiles  in rural  markets  that  it is difficult 
at times to separate the theory from the facts.' For example, they 
postulate  constant marginal  costs, so the minimum  size of firms  is set 
only by fixed  costs. This  is conceivably  an approximation  of the costs of 
automobile  retailing.  But at other times they assume  empirical  relation- 
ships that do not seem appealing  in automobile  retailing-for example 
that  the fixed  or variable  costs, or both, of a second firm  are higher  than 
those of the first  firm  in the market. 
Their  model,  then, predicts  that  once a market  becomes large  enough 
to support  one firm,  there will usually be an entrant.  When the market 
becomes  large  enough  to support  a second firm-a  size more  than  twice 
that  of the monopoly  market  because of the assumption  of higher  costs 
for the second firm-the second firm  will also usually  enter. Apparently 
they assume that the monopoly firm does not price its services to 
discourage  entry, although  they do not test this possibility.  The effect of 
a third  firm  is not examined. 
To implement  the model  they must  identify  monopolists  and  therefore 
the markets  for the retailing  of automobiles.  To find monopolies, they 
choose rural  areas, and I shall devote my attention  almost exclusively 
to this fundamental  step. 
Bresnahan  and Reiss construct their markets  very much as Johann 
Heinrich  von Thunen  constructed  his isolated state.2  The county is the 
unit,  and  the market  consists of its largest  town (sometimes  modified  for 
factors such as people living within 10 miles of the town) with certain 
qualifications,  such as that no very large city is within 125  miles of the 
town. Their 149 towns have a mean population  of 1,885. The market 
towns in effect answer the question: How far would Bresnahan  and 
Reiss drive to buy a car and have it serviced? How fortunate  that they 
did  not collaborate  with a colleague  of mine  who used to take a bus from 
Chicago  to Detroit  to buy his automobiles  more  cheaply. 
I doubt  very much that these markets  approach  economic markets. 
We could test them crudely  by seeing how many cars are registered  in 
the town the authors define as a market. I predict that the number 
substantially  exceeds the accumulated  sales of the dealers  in the town. 
Indeed,  they find  no dealers  in 34 towns with a mean  population  of 817. 
1. These comments are directed toward an earlier version of the authors' paper. 
2.  Johann Heinrich von Thuren (1783-1850),  The Isolated  State,  translated by Carla 
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Do these people walk? Again, I predict that the registrations  would 
reveal substantial  numbers  of automobile makes not represented by 
dealers  in their  market.  In addition,  automobile  repairs  account  for one- 
fifth of the receipts of automobile  dealers and a considerably higher 
share  of the purchase  and  repair  expenditures  of drivers  and  of the value- 
added  of dealers.  I suspect  that  repair  services have different  markets  in 
significant  respects from those of car retailing.  The independent  repair 
shops muddy  the count  of firms. 
The authors  reinforce  their concept of market  in the finding  that the 
variable  representing  population  adjacent  to the town and the share of 
town population  commuting  to work outside the county do not enter 
significantly  into statistical analyses using their market  concept. The 
easy alternative  interpretation  is that their concept is so defective that 
minor  amendments  cannot save it. A fundamental  test of their markets 
could be made  either  by a survey of auto owners or by a comparison  of 
retail price levels and movements  of automobiles  across their markets 
and neighboring  areas. 
Thus  the ambiguity  of their  market  concept introduces  a fundamental 
ambiguity  in their results. The demand curves for their markets are 
probably  highly  elastic, and their  model should  yield primarily  compet- 
itive results  in the rural  retail  automobile  market. 
A problem  is raised by the study of cross-sectional data on market 
entry. The authors  observe no entry and must employ the differences 
between  two-dealer  towns  in 1980  (after  corrections  for  per  capita  income 
and demographic  variables) to estimate what change in market size 
attracted  a second dealer. Their dealer count pertains  only to 1982, so 
they have no knowledge  of entry, and  in particular  must  assume that  all 
entrants  date  from  long  enough  ago  to have  reached  long-run  equilibrium. 
Their  data  source  presumably  would have allowed  a count of dealers  by 
market  for earlier  years. Hence their  findings  are strictly  relevant  only 
to equilibrium  market  structures  and shed only a weak light  on entry. 
I accept their  main  conclusion  that entry of a second dealer  does not 
lead to a large  increase  in competition.  I attribute  this result to the fact 
that  there  was not much  room  for an increase  in competition. 
One can also analyze  the effects of numbers  of rivals  on competition 
more directly, and in particular  measure the effects on price. A well- 
known  example  is Reuben  Kessel's study of the effect of the number  of 
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the bidding  price, reoffer  price, and underwriters'  spread.3  His sample 
was huge, so corrections  should  be made  for size of issue, call  provisions, 
credit  rating  of the issue, and  so on. After  correcting  for such differences 
among  issues, Kessel found  a powerful  effect of number  on underwriters' 
spreads,  for example.  One  attained  full competition  with  at most a dozen 
bidders,  and  the excess of the underwriters'  spread  per bond  with  fewer 
numbers  was, for general  obligation  bonds, $5.09  with  one bidder,  $2.50 
with two bidders, $2.33 with three bidders, and finally, $0.72 with six 
bidders.  Thus only a single additional  rival was necessary to halve the 
monopoly  premium  in the spread.  This kind  of analysis  is possible for a 
variety  of markets.  The advantage  of such an approach  compared  with 
that  of Bresnahan  and  Reiss is that  it requires  many  fewer assumptions, 
although  obviously it faces the same problem  of market  determination. 
Discussion 
In response  to Robert  Willig's  and  George  Stigler's  comments,  Peter 
Reiss claimed that the entry threshold  ratio was not intended  to have 
normative  implications  but to serve as a summary  statistic describing 
something  important  about  the conditions  of entry  in a market.  The ETR 
is a concept relevant only for well-defined  and distinct markets  and is 
intended  to focus attention  on the distinction  between  competition  issues 
and market definition issues  in studies of  market entry. Apparent 
systematic  differences  among  industries  in the magnitude  of the ETRs 
suggests, he added, that it may be possible to identify factors such as 
sunk  costs that  account  for these differences. 
Reiss also noted that the study provides information  that could help 
to establish  that  the ETR  exceeds two because the incumbent  firm  raises 
barriers  to entry. This would counter  Willig's  proposal  that the second 
firm  does not enter until the market  is at least twice that necessary to 
support  a firm  operating  at the minimum  efficient  scale. This entry size 
may be much larger  than the monopoly entry size, and hence result in 
an ETR much larger  than two. If the latter hypothesis is true, Reiss 
pointed  out, variable  profits  should  not fall after  entry. For some of the 
markets  studied  by the authors,  the ratio of duopoly variable  profits  to 
3. Reuben  Kessel, "A Study  of the Effects of Competition  in the Tax-Exempt  Bond 
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monopoly variable  profits  was estimated to be close to one, which is 
consistent  with Willig's  theory. 
Richard  Gilbert  noted  that  the paper  provides  a measurable  definition 
of barriers  to entry that integrates  both structural  and behavioral  char- 
acteristics  of the market.  To discover  whether  some markets  tend  toward 
monopoly  would mean sorting  out what factors lead to the differences 
in  ETRs  among  industries.  Richard  Schmalensee  suggested,  for  example, 
that sunk costs in the form  of established  reputations  may be the factor 
that  discriminates  best among  the  industries  in  this  study.  The  importance 
of reputations may explain why electrical contractors seem to have 
much  higher  ETRs  than  plumbing  contractors;  it may  be harder  to verify 
the quality  of the electrical  product  or the service provided  immediately 
after  purchase.  What  matters  is not  just that  the lights  work  but that  the 
house not burn  down, he noted. 
Several  participants  seemed  concerned  that  the authors'  methodology 
may have systematically  undercounted  the effective number  of firms 
performing  professional services.  Daniel McFadden observed that, 
especially in very small isolated communities, people often perform 
services for each other that are not in their main line of business. The 
service station owner may also broker  cars, for example, or the local 
preacher  may cut hair during  the week. Zvi Griliches  added that such 
people may not want to pay extra  for a business phone, and hence may 
not have listings in the yellow pages, or may not want to be identified 
publicly as performing  these services because they may not report  the 
income. And  John  Meyer  pointed  out that  licensing  standards  may  often 
be overlooked in isolated communities. If the minister becomes a 
plumber  on weekdays, the townspeople  are unlikely  to worry  about  his 
competence, even though  he may not be licensed. 
Edward  Denison added  that the study not only failed to account for 
such people performing  services part-time  but treated  a group  practice 
as a single firm, which may also lead to undercounting  the number  of 
firms  in professional  services. He suggested that the relevant measure 
of the number of  "firms" should instead be the number of people 
performing  the service. And Meyer pointed that the portability  of the 
service in question is also relevant. People can drive into a city once a 
month  for multipurpose  shopping  trips  and visit their  dentist, barber,  or 
optometrist  on the same trip. But plumbers,  electricians,  and  veterinar- 
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Bresnahan  responded  that  the authors  tried  reclassifying  multiperson 
firms and their results were essentially unchanged. They also used 
census data to check their sampling  procedure  for dentists and doctors 
and again  found that their results were unchanged.  Reiss defended  the 
market  definition  test used by the authors  against  proponents  of what  he 
called  the "Aunt  Matilda  effect.  " For  every Aunt  Matilda  who is willing 
to drive 300 miles to get her hair cut, he asserted, there is an Uncle 
Charley  who will not. As long as there was enough heterogeneity  that 
the demand  curves facing the firms  in their sample were not perfectly 
elastic, then  those firms  had  some market  power, and  the question  posed 
by the authors-whether the markets  tended toward monopoly-is  a 
relevant  one. 